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CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION  
IN POST-1997 HONG KONG 
Albert H. Y. Chen† 
Abstract:  In July 1997, the British colony of Hong Kong was returned to the 
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”).  It became a Special Administrative Region 
(“SAR”) of the PRC in accordance with the concept of “one country, two systems” 
embodied by the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984.  The constitutional instrument of 
Hong Kong’s new legal and political system is the Basic Law of the SAR of Hong Kong, 
enacted by the National People’s Congress of the PRC and effective as of July 1997. 
Under colonial rule, Hong Kong inherited a British-style legal system.  English 
common law formed the foundation, and the British tradition of the Rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary were transplanted to Hong Kong.  In the post-War era, the 
people of Hong Kong enjoyed relatively more civil liberties than did the people of 
mainland China and Taiwan.  Since the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 
1984, the legal system of Hong Kong was further liberalized, and the political system 
partially democratized.  Following the Tiananmen massacre of 1989, the British colonial 
government introduced into Hong Kong’s constitution a Bill of Rights for the purpose of 
boosting residents’ confidence in Hong Kong’s future.  Since the enactment of the Hong 
Kong Bill of Rights, the courts of Hong Kong have developed a solid body of case law on 
the protection of human rights, and have begun to exercise the power of judicial review 
of legislation.  The era of constitutional adjudication thus began in Hong Kong. 
After the establishment of the SAR of Hong Kong in 1997, the judiciary faced dual 
challenges of finding a place in the new constitutional order of “one country, two 
systems” and leading Hong Kong forward in its legal and constitutional development.  
Delicate issues of Hong Kong’s constitutional relationship with the central government in 
Beijing have arisen, which often underscore the contradiction between the Communist 
Party-led legal system in mainland China and the tradition of judicial independence and 
the Rule of law in Hong Kong.  At the same time, the courts of Hong Kong have had to 
tackle the classic constitutional problem of trying to work out the appropriate balance 
between civil liberties on the one hand and public order and communitarian values on the 
other hand.  This article will review and evaluate how the Hong Kong courts have 
responded to these challenges.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
In July 1997, the British colony of Hong Kong was returned to the 
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) in accordance with the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration of 1984 and became a Special Administrative Region 
(“SAR”) of the PRC.  The Joint Declaration provided in detail how Hong 
Kong would be governed after 1997.  Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree 
of autonomy under Chinese sovereignty, and its existing economic, social 
and legal systems would be preserved.  The constitutional arrangement, 
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known as “one country, two systems,” has been said to be an important 
innovation that contributes to the practice of peaceful resolution of 
international disputes.1  
The constitutional instrument of Hong Kong’s new legal and political 
system is the Basic Law of the SAR of Hong Kong, a law for the governance 
of post-1997 Hong Kong enacted by the National People’s Congress of the 
PRC in 1990.  The concept of “one country, two systems” has been given 
concrete legal form in the Basic Law, which came into force on July 1, 1997. 
The Basic Law is now the “mini-constitution” of Hong Kong as an 
autonomous territory within the PRC.2 
Under colonial rule, Hong Kong inherited a British-style legal 
system.3 English common law formed the foundation of Hong Kong’s legal 
system,4 and the British tradition of the Rule of law and the independence of 
the judiciary were transplanted to Hong Kong.5 In the post-War era, Hong 
Kong Chinese enjoyed relatively more civil liberties than Chinese in both 
mainland China and Taiwan.6  After the signing of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration in 1984, the legal system of Hong Kong was further liberalized,7 
and the political system partially democratized.8  Following the Tiananmen 
incident of 1989, the British colonial government introduced into Hong 
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Kong’s legal system a Bill of Rights for the purpose of boosting residents’ 
confidence in Hong Kong’s future.9  Since the enactment of the Hong Kong 
Bill of Rights Ordinance in 1991, the courts of Hong Kong have developed a 
solid body of case law on the protection of human rights, and have begun to 
exercise the power of judicial review of legislation.10  The era of 
constitutional adjudication thus began in Hong Kong. 
After the establishment of the SAR of Hong Kong in 1997, the courts 
of Hong Kong had to face the new challenges of finding their place in the 
new constitutional order of “one country, two systems” and leading the new-
born Hong Kong SAR forward in its legal and constitutional development.  
Delicate issues of Hong Kong’s constitutional relationship with the central 
government in Beijing have arisen, which often underscore the contradiction 
between the Communist Party-led legal system in mainland China and the 
tradition of judicial independence and the Rule of law in Hong Kong. 11  At 
the same time, the courts of Hong Kong have to tackle the classic 
constitutional problem of trying to work out the appropriate balance between 
individuals’ rights on the one hand and public interest on the other hand, and 
to resolve internal tensions within Hong Kong society generated by 
conflicting demands among different classes and groups.  
This article reviews and evaluates how the Hong Kong courts have 
responded to this dual challenge of defining Hong Kong’s constitutional 
relationship with Beijing and of defending rights while delineating the limits 
of these rights.  It argues that, considering the inevitable tensions that inhere 
in the constitutional experiment of “one country, two systems,” the record of 
the Hong Kong courts in dealing with these challenges has thus far been 
positive.  The judiciary, led by the Final Court of Appeal, has chosen the 
middle path12 or the “golden mean”13 between confrontation with and 
subservience to Beijing, and between judicial activism and judicial restraint.  
In tackling their relationship with Beijing, the courts have adopted an 
approach that may be described—in a phrase translated from the Chinese—
as “neither too proud nor too humble” (bukang bubei).  In the domain of 
human rights, the tenor of the courts’ decisions may be described as 
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moderately liberal—neither radically liberal nor conservative.  This article 
suggests that such a middle path is indeed appropriate in the context of Hong 
Kong under “one country, two systems.” 
This article, including this introduction (Part I), is divided into five 
parts.  Part II examines how the Hong Kong judiciary has contributed to 
shaping the evolving constitutional relationship between the Hong Kong 
SAR and the central government in Beijing.  Part III considers the role of the 
Hong Kong courts as guardians of the rights enshrined in the Basic Law.  
Part IV considers the significance of Hong Kong’s experience in the practice 
of “one country, two systems” for China as a whole.  In Part V, the article 
will conclude with some general reflections on the work of Hong Kong’s 
judiciary in constitutional adjudication in the post-1997 era. 
II. THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HONG KONG 
AND BEIJING 
This part will begin by explaining the characteristics of the general 
constitutional framework of “one country, two systems” in which Hong 
Kong operates.  It then reviews in chronological order the major court cases 
and related constitutional events that have marked the evolving 
constitutional relationship between Hong Kong and Beijing since the 
establishment of the Hong Kong SAR.  It will conclude with some 
reflections on the jurisprudence of “one country, two systems” that the Hong 
Kong courts have developed.  
A. The Constitutional Framework of “One Country, Two Systems” 
Like federalism, “one country, two systems” (“OCTS”) as practiced in 
Hong Kong (and also in Macau, a Portuguese colony returned to the PRC in 
1999)14 is a constitutional arrangement under which a local or regional 
government enjoys autonomy15 with regard to a specified range of domestic 
affairs within the region.  A legal formula typically divides power between 
the central or national government on the one hand and the local or regional 
government on the other hand.  The wider the range of domestic affairs 
within the jurisdiction of the regional government, the higher its degree of 
autonomy.  The more constitutionally entrenched the formula for the 
division of power, the more secure is the region’s autonomy.   
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Hong Kong, under OCTS, enjoys a high degree of autonomy.  Its 
autonomy is greater than that enjoyed by states and provinces of federal 
countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia.16  Basically, all 
governmental affairs in the Hong Kong SAR other than defense and foreign 
affairs are within the scope of the SAR’s autonomy.  The PRC mainland’s 
criminal and civil laws are not applicable to Hong Kong; Hong Kong does 
not need to pay any tax to the mainland government; Hong Kong has its own 
currency, administers its own system of entry and exit controls on persons, is 
a separate customs territory, and can sign international agreements relating 
to non-sovereign business.  These features suggest that Hong Kong’s 
autonomy far surpasses those of the constituent units of most federal states.  
When we turn from the breadth of autonomy to the legal security of 
autonomy however, Hong Kong under OCTS does not compare as favorably 
with states or provinces of the United States, Canada or Australia.  This is 
because the formula for division of power between the central government 
and the SAR is not entrenched in the PRC Constitution itself.  The formula 
is provided for instead in the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR “HKSAR,” 
a law made, and amendable unilaterally17 by, the National People’s Congress 
("NPC"), which is the supreme legislative organ of the PRC.  Indeed, 
mainland Chinese scholars prefer to use the language of “delegation of 
power” by the national government to the SAR rather than that of “division 
of power” between the national government and the SAR.18  Furthermore, 
unlike in the United States, Canada and Australia, there is no national 
Supreme Court in OCTS that arbitrates and resolves jurisdictional disputes 
between the national government and the regional government.  Instead, the 
highest authority for the interpretation of the Basic Law, including the 
formula for division of power embodied in the Basic Law, is the NPC 
Standing Committee ("NPCSC")19—a political or parliamentary institution 
rather than a Supreme Court or constitutional court staffed by judges and 
jurists.  The lack of legitimacy—in the eyes of many people in Hong Kong, 
particularly its legal community and a significant segment of its political 
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elite—of the NPCSC in performing the task of constitutional interpretation 
has proved to be the major cause of constitutional controversies in post-1997 
Hong Kong.  
B. The Ma Wai Kwan Case 
The first of these controversies between the national and regional 
governments arose at the time of the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR 
in 1997, and related to the legality of the establishment of the Provisional 
Legislative Council ("PLC") by the Preparatory Committee for the SAR 
appointed by the NPCSC.  Critics, including pro-democracy politicians20 in 
Hong Kong and the influential Hong Kong Bar Association,21 alleged that 
the PLC was not lawfully established as it was not provided for in the Basic 
Law.  Since the Basic Law was enacted in 1990 on the assumption that there 
would be a political “through train” in the sense that the members of the pre-
1997 legislature would become members of the first legislature of the 
SAR,22 there was no provision for the establishment of the PLC (whose 
members where chosen by the Preparatory Committee).  The PLC was 
basically a contingency measure to deal with the “derailing” of the through 
train as a result of political reforms introduced by Governor Chris Patten in 
the mid-1990’s, which Beijing considered to be contrary to the Basic Law 
and to the understanding reached between the Chinese and British 
Governments when the Basic Law was enacted in 1990.23  
The constitutional issues revolving around the PLC were adjudicated 
shortly after the SAR was established in HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan,24 a case 
decided by Hong Kong’s Court of Appeal on July 29, 1997.  Ma Wai Kwan 
was a criminal case, where the main issue was whether the common law had 
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survived the handover. One of the arguments for the common law’s survival 
was that the PLC had enacted an ordinance25 which provided for the 
common law’s survival.  The question of whether the PLC had been lawfully 
established therefore arose.  
In its judgment the Court of Appeal affirmed the legality of the PLC, 
pointing out that its establishment was consistent with the text and the 
purpose of the Basic Law, given the derailing of the through train and the 
need for an interim legislative authority to exist immediately upon the 
establishment of the SAR.  Another reason given by the court in support of 
its ruling however, proved to be controversial, and paved the way for a 
subsequent constitutional crisis during the spring of 1999.  The court 
concluded that as a local or regional court, it had no power to review or 
overturn an act of a sovereign authority such as the NPC or the NPCSC.  It 
reasoned that article nineteen of the Basic Law maintains but does not enlarge 
the pre-existing jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts.   As the court could not 
question the validity of an act of the sovereign before 1997 (such as an Act of 
Parliament applicable to Hong Kong or the appointment of the Governor of 
Hong Kong), it likewise could not adjudicate the validity of an act of the NPC 
or the NPCSC after 1997.  This reasoning was however criticized by some 
commentators26 on the ground that the colonial analogy regarding the 
relationship between the imperial government in the metropolitan territory and 
the overseas colony was inappropriate to the new constitutional order of Hong 
Kong.  Though this analogy may indeed be questionable, it does not 
necessarily follow that the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal was 
wrong.  It is indeed doubtful whether a Hong Kong court may strike down an 
act of the NPC or NPCSC.27  We shall return to this point later.28  
A less noticed, but equally if not more important aspect of the Ma Wa 
Kwan case concerns the power of Hong Kong courts to review acts of the 
Hong Kong legislature.  While it accepted the Solicitor General’s submission 
that Hong Kong courts have no power to review the acts of the national 
legislative organs in Beijing, the Court of Appeal also accepted his argument 
that since Hong Kong courts had before 1997 enjoyed the power to review 
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the constitutionality of local legislation (on the basis of the Letters Patent – 
the colonial constitution), and article nineteen of the Basic Law enables 
them to retain their former jurisdiction, the courts of the Hong Kong SAR 
have the “power to determine the constitutionality of SAR-made laws vis-à-
vis the Basic Law.”29  Although this part of the judgment is dicta, it dealt with 
the most crucial issue in the new constitutional order of Hong Kong, and the 
proposition it upheld has never been challenged by any party in subsequent 
cases.  In this way, Ma Wai Kwan paved the way for subsequent decisions by 
the Hong Kong courts exercising the power of judicial review of SAR laws 
alleged to be inconsistent with the Basic Law.  The Ma case may thus be 
regarded as the Marbury v. Madison30 of the constitutional history of the Hong 
Kong SAR.    
C. The Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga Cases and Their Aftermath 
1. The Cases 
The issues of the legality of the PLC and of whether the acts of the 
Beijing authorities are susceptible to judicial review in Hong Kong came 
before the Hong Kong courts again—this time the Court of Final Appeal 
(CFA)—in the case of Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration.31 The CFA 
was established at the same time as the establishment of the Hong Kong 
SAR in July 1997,32 and replaced the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council as the final appellate court in Hong Kong’s legal system.  The Basic 
Law33 vests the power of final adjudication of all cases litigated in Hong 
Kong in the CFA; there is no channel of appeal to a mainland Chinese court 
whereby the CFA’s judgments may be overturned.  On  January 29, 1999, the 
CFA rendered its judgments in the cases of Ng Ka Ling v. Director of 
Immigration34 and Chan Kam Nga v. Director of Immigration.35  In these 
decisions the CFA attempted to assert its supreme judicial authority as the 
constitutional guardian of the Basic Law, of Hong Kong’s autonomy and of 
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the rights of the people of Hong Kong.  Unfortunately, the CFA's assertions 
backfired and ultimately led to Beijing’s intervention. 
Both Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga were appeals to the final 
appellate court from lower courts by seekers of the “right of abode” in Hong 
Kong.  The applicants were children of Hong Kong permanent residents, but 
they were born on the mainland.  Some were born before their parents 
became Hong Kong permanent residents; some were born after at least one 
of their parents became such residents (e.g. the children were born on the 
mainland to women whose husbands were Hong Kong permanent residents 
living in Hong Kong); some were illegitimate children.  The children 
claimed the right of abode in Hong Kong under the Basic Law,36 and argued 
that the immigration legislation (passed by the PLC)37 that defined who was 
entitled to the right (thereby excluding them from entitlement) and regulated 
the procedures for migration to Hong Kong for settlement was in 
contravention of the Basic Law.  Two controversies resulted from the CFA’s 
decisions in these two cases.  
2. The Constitutional Jurisdiction of Hong Kong Courts to Review Acts 
of the NPC or NPCSC 
The first controversy arose in the context of the CFA’s handling of the 
issue of the legality of the PLC.  In Ng Ka Ling, the CFA heard arguments 
that the immigration legislation passed by the PLC was invalid as the PLC 
itself was not lawfully established.  While the CFA reached the same 
conclusion as the Court of Appeal in Ma Wai Kwan regarding the legality of 
the PLC, it attempted in its judgment to overrule the Court of Appeal’s 
ruling in Ma that Hong Kong courts had no jurisdiction to overturn acts of 
the NPC or NPCSC.  The CFA stated in Ng Ka Ling that Hong Kong courts 
have jurisdiction “to examine whether any legislative acts of the National 
People’s Congress or its Standing Committee are consistent with the Basic 
Law and to declare them to be invalid if found to be inconsistent” 
(hereinafter called “the Statement”).38  This provoked an immediate strong 
reaction from mainland China,39 and led to the SAR Government’s 
                                           
36
 Basic Law, art. 24(2)(3). 
37
 The Immigration Ordinance, Schedule No. 2, (1997), and the Immigration Ordinance, Schedule 
No. 3 (1997). 
38
 Ng Ka Ling, [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 315. 337 (C.F.A.). 
39
 In a highly publicized seminar reported in Hong Kong and mainland Chinese media on 7 February 
1999, four leading Chinese law professors, who were also former members of the Drafting Committee for 
the Basic Law and the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of the HKSAR, attacked the statement. 
They suggested that it had the effect of placing Hong Kong courts above the NPC, which is the supreme 
organ of state power under the Chinese Constitution, and of turning Hong Kong into an “independent 




unprecedented and unexpected application to the CFA to “clarify” the 
relevant part of its judgment.  The CFA acceded to the request and stated that 
(1) the Hong Kong courts’ power to interpret the Basic Law is derived from 
the NPCSC under article 158 of the Basic Law; (2) any interpretation made 
by the NPCSC under article 158 would be binding on the Hong Kong courts; 
and, (3) the judgment of January 29 did not question the authority of the 
NPC and its Standing Committee “to do any act which is in accordance with 
the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure therein.”40 
3. The Significance of the “Clarification” 
The very act of applying to the CFA for “clarification” was, as of 
February 1999, the government's most controversial act in the short 
constitutional history of the Hong Kong SAR.  There was no precedent for 
such an intervention and the legal basis for the application was dubious.41  It 
was clear to everyone in Hong Kong that the application was made entirely 
because of Beijing’s displeasure with the CFA's Statement.  The application 
was thus fiercely criticized by outspoken members of the legal community 
and pro-democracy politicians as a blatant exertion of political pressure on 
the highest court of Hong Kong.42  
The application for “clarification” represented the first major test 
endured by the CFA since its establishment in 1997.  The CFA had three 
options: (a) reject the application and decline to “clarify”; (b) “clarify” by 
retreating from its original position; or (c) “clarify” without such a retreat.  
Considering the matter strictly from the legal perspective, there was much to 
be said for the first option.  The political consequences of choosing the first 
option, however, could have been serious.  The “war of words” between 
Beijing and those in Hong Kong’s legal community defending the CFA’s 
original Statement could have escalated.  It was also conceivable that 
Beijing might resort to its power of interpretation of the Basic Law in order 
                                                                                                                              
political entity.”  After the HKSAR’s Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung’s visit to Beijing on 12-13 February 
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to resolve the constitutional issue.43  On the other hand, by acting pursuant to 
the second or third option, the CFA could at least take the matter into its own 
hands, seize the initiative and steer the way forward in an attempt to resolve 
the crisis.  It may be said therefore, that the CFA’s rejection of the first 
option was a sensible course of action in difficult circumstances.  
In retrospect, the CFA’s “clarification” may be considered a skillful 
and successful maneuver.  The crisp one-page judgment issued by the CFA 
was ambiguous enough to sustain different interpretations.  No one could tell 
for sure whether the CFA had chosen the second or third option.  Both 
Bejing and Hong Kong’s legal communities could read from it what they 
desired.  The CFA’s “clarification” was generally understood at the time by 
Hong Kong’s legal community,44 not as a retreat from the court’s original 
position as defined in its judgment of January 29th, but as a statement 
rendering explicit what was implicit in its original judgment.  The original 
judgment after all, never attempted to deny the NPCSC’s power to interpret 
the Basic Law.  The powers that be in Beijing also seemed satisfied with the 
“clarification.”45  The “clarification” was, therefore, effective in resolving 
the constitutional crisis precipitated by the CFA’s Statement.  The 
jurisprudential problems at issue, however, are more complicated than 
suggested by the text of the “clarification” and have remained unresolved.46  
In particular, it is not clear whether the Hong Kong court has jurisdiction to 
review an act of the NPC or NPCSC when the act is not accompanied by a 
formal interpretation by the NPCSC stating that the act is compatible with 
the Basic Law.  Conversely, if such an interpretation is made simultaneously 
with the promulgation of the act, it is clear under the “clarification” that the 
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Hong Kong courts will be bound by the interpretation and cannot review the 
act. 
The issue of whether the acts of Beijing authorities are susceptible to 
review by the Hong Kong courts has so far been merely theoretical.  Apart 
from the abovementioned cases on the legality of the PLC,47 no case has yet 
arisen in which any act of the NPC, NPCSC, or any other central 
government agency has been challenged before a Hong Kong court.48  There 
also has been no litigation of the kind common in federal states arising from 
jurisdictional disputes between the central government and the autonomous 
regional governments.  
This lack of dispute is largely attributable to the fact that under the 
OCTS arrangement, the SAR’s autonomy level is so high that in practice 
almost every matter (other than defense and foreign affairs on which no 
controversies have arisen in the short lifespan of the Hong Kong SAR) falls 
within the SAR’s jurisdiction.  Furthermore, few acts have actually been 
performed by the Beijing authorities with regard to Hong Kong in exercise 
of the former’s power under the Basic Law.  For example, article seventeen 
of the Basic Law empowers the NPCSC to nullify any law made by the 
Hong Kong SAR legislature, but this power has never been exercised.  
Article eighteen of the Basic Law provides for a short list of mainland 
Chinese laws (including, for example, the Chinese Nationality Law) which 
apply to the Hong Kong SAR; mainland laws that are not so listed are 
inapplicable to Hong Kong.  It also empowers the NPCSC to add to the list 
where necessary.  The only laws added to the list after 1997 were the Law on 
the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, an uncontroversial 
law relating to the law of the sea that was made applicable to Hong Kong in 
December 1998,49 and the Law on the Immunity Against Judicial Execution 
of the Property of Foreign Central Banks, another uncontroversial law made 
applicable to Hong Kong in October 2005.50 
The “clarification” mentioned above refers to article 158 of the Basic 
Law. This article—one of the most crucial provisions of the Basic Law—
establishes a complex scheme in which both the NPCSC and courts of Hong 
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Kong may interpret the Basic Law.  Article 158(1) declares that “[t]he power 
of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the NPCSC.”  Article 158(2) 
and (3) authorize the courts of Hong Kong to interpret the Basic Law when 
adjudicating cases, except that the CFA should refer to the NPCSC for 
interpretation of relevant Basic Law provisions “concerning affairs which 
are the responsibility of the Central People’s Government, or . . . the 
relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region.”51  The article 
also mandates consultation with the Basic Law Committee52 before the 
NPCSC issues an interpretation, and provides that judgments already given 
by Hong Kong courts before an NPCSC interpretation will not be affected 
by that interpretation.  This “legislative interpretation,” as it is called in the 
PRC legal system,53 only binds the courts when they try cases after the 
interpretation has been promulgated. 
The practical significance of the “clarification,” which also may be 
considered an inference from the text of the Basic Law itself, is that the 
Hong Kong courts’ power to interpret the Basic Law and to determine 
whether it is consistent with acts of government authorities is not absolute.  
It is not absolute because it is subject to the overriding power of the NPCSC.  
In the absence of an interpretation by the NPCSC, the Hong Kong courts 
have full authority to interpret the Basic Law on their own and to decide 
cases in accordance with their own interpretation.  Once the NPCSC has 
spoken however, the Hong Kong courts must comply.  But when can the 
NPCSC speak? Can it speak only when the CFA asks for its interpretation in 
accordance with article 158(3) of the Basic Law? Or can it speak even when 
not asked by the CFA? This question was answered in the course of the 
second controversy flowing from the CFA’s January 29th decision. 
4. Interpretation by the NPCSC 
The second controversy stemmed from the CFA’s interpretation of 
articles 24(2)(3) and 22(4) of the Basic Law, and its decision not to refer the 
latter to the NPCSC for interpretation even though that article seemed to be 
covered by article 158(3) of the Basic Law.  Article 24(2)(3) of the Basic 
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Law confers the right of abode in Hong Kong on children born in mainland 
China of Hong Kong permanent residents.54  It is ambiguous however as to 
whether the right is confined to a child of at least one parent who was 
already a Hong Kong permanent resident at the time of the child’s birth (“the 
narrow interpretation”), or whether it extends also to a child whose parents 
were not Hong Kong permanent residents at the time of the child’s birth, but 
at least one of the parents subsequently became a Hong Kong permanent 
resident (“the broad interpretation”).  Article 22(4) provides that “people 
from other parts of China” must apply for approval from the mainland 
authorities in order to enter Hong Kong.  It too is ambiguous however, 
regarding whether this requirement is only applicable to mainland residents 
who have no right of abode in Hong Kong under article twenty-four of the 
Basic Law (“the narrow interpretation”) or whether the requirement is also 
applicable to those mainland residents on whom the right of abode in Hong 
Kong has been conferred by article 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law (“the broad 
interpretation”).   
In the course of the litigation, the Court of First Instance adopted the 
broad interpretation of article 24(2)(3) and the broad interpretation of article 
22(4).  The Court of Appeal adopted the narrow interpretation of article 
24(2)(3) and the broad interpretation of article 22(4).  When the cases were 
appealed to the CFA, the CFA chose the broad interpretation of article 
24(2)(3) and the narrow interpretation of article 22(4).  It also decided that 
article 22(4) need not be referred to the NPCSC for interpretation, because it 
was not the “predominant provision” to be interpreted in the case.  It found 
the “predominant provision” to be article 24(2), which in the CFA’s opinion 
did not concern the central government’s responsibility or the relationship 
between the central government and the SAR and did not therefore need to 
be referred to the NPCSC.55 
On the basis of sample surveys and statistical studies conducted after 
the CFA’s decisions were rendered, the SAR Government estimated that the 
implementation of articles 24(2)(3) and 22(4) as interpreted by the CFA 
would mean that Hong Kong would need to absorb a migrant population 
from mainland China of 1.67 million in the coming decade,56 imposing a 
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social and economic burden so enormous that Hong Kong would find it 
hardly endurable.  In the Government’s opinion however, Hong Kong would 
not need to bear this burden because the CFA’s interpretation of the relevant 
Basic Law provisions was of dubious validity.  The Government argued that 
although the CFA is the court of final adjudication in Hong Kong, it is not 
necessarily the final tribunal for the interpretation of the Basic Law, because 
under article 158(1) of the Basic Law the NPC Standing Committee has the 
ultimate authority to interpret the Basic Law. 
Thus on May 21, 1999, the Chief Executive, Mr. Tung Chee-hwa, 
requested the State Council to refer the relevant Basic Law provisions to the 
NPCSC for interpretation.57  This decision was made in the midst of strong 
opposition from certain sectors of the community, particularly the legal 
profession and the pro-democracy politicians.  The request was granted, and 
the NPCSC issued an interpretation on June 26, 1999.58  The NPCSC 
adopted the narrow interpretation of article 24(2)(3) and the broad 
interpretation of article 22(4), the same as those adopted by the Court of 
Appeal before its decision was overturned by the CFA.  The CFA’s decision 
on these points was effectively overruled, although the parties to the 
litigation were not to be affected by the NPCSC’s interpretation.59  In the 
text of its decision, the NPCSC also pointed out that the litigation did 
involve Basic Law provisions concerning the central government’s 
responsibility or the central-SAR relationship.  It noted that these issues 
ought to have been referred to the NPCSC for interpretation by the CFA 
under article 158(3).  
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5. The Significance of the Interpretation 
The referral to the NPCSC for interpretation was extremely 
controversial because there is nothing in the Basic Law which suggests that 
the executive branch of the SAR Government can request the NPCSC to 
interpret the Basic Law.  Furthermore, the reference to the NPCSC was 
criticized as a self-inflicted blow to Hong Kong’s autonomy, judicial 
authority, Rule of law, and system for protecting individual rights.60  The 
SAR Government probably recognized that these were indeed the negative 
implications of the referral, but decided nevertheless that this price was 
worth paying as the alternative scenario of absorbing the huge number of 
migrants from the mainland was even less palatable.  
The nature of constitutional judicial review is such that once a 
Supreme Court or constitutional court has determined the constitutionality of 
a legislative enactment, this legal position cannot be reversed by ordinary 
legislative processes.  Normally the legal position may be reversed only by a 
constitutional amendment.  Under the constitutional arrangement established 
by the Basic Law, the Hong Kong legislature has no power to amend the 
Basic Law—the constitutional instrument of the Hong Kong SAR.  Only the 
NPC has the power to do so.61  Thus any attempt to reverse the legal position 
as defined by the CFA in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga regarding the 
unconstitutionality of existing legislation governing the right of abode would 
require referral of the matter to Beijing and its cooperation. 
From a theoretical point of view, it would have been possible for the 
Hong Kong Government to propose to Beijing an amendment to the Basic 
Law in order to address the migration problems generated by the CFA’s 
decisions.62  There were however, at least two factors which led to this 
amendment being ruled out.63  First, the NPC only meets once a year in a 
spring session lasting several weeks.  Thus the earliest an amendment could 
be enacted was spring 2000.  Before this time, existing migrants would have 
qualified as Hong Kong permanent residents in accordance with the CFA’s 
rulings, and there would also be a flood of new migrants coming to Hong 
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Kong to benefit from the rulings.  Secondly, the Beijing authorities were 
apparently of the view that this was a case in which the CFA should have 
referred the relevant Basic Law provisions to the NPCSC for interpretation 
in the first place in accordance with article 158 of the Basic Law.  This view 
is in fact shared by some Hong Kong and overseas academic commentators 
on the Ng Ka Ling case.64  It therefore made sense to address the problems—
problems caused by the CFA's “incorrect” interpretation resulting from its 
failure to refer the matter to the NPCSC—by utilizing the NPCSC's power of 
interpretation to “correct” the CFA’s interpretation.  When all these factors 
are taken into account, the Government’s ultimate decision to refer the 
matter to the NPCSC could not be considered unreasonable or contemptuous 
of the Rule of law.  It was understandable and to a large extent dictated by 
the structural constraints inherent in the Basic Law and the Chinese 
constitutional system.  
It should be noted that although the CFA’s interpretation of article 
24(2)(3) in Chan Kam Nga and article 22(4) in Ng Ka Ling is no longer 
good law after the NPCSC interpretation, other parts of the Na Ka Ling 
judgment still stand because they were not touched by the interpretation.  
For example, in Ng Ka Ling the CFA struck down the part of the 
Immigration Ordinance65 which denied the right of abode in the Hong Kong 
SAR to mainland-born illegitimate children whose fathers were Hong Kong 
permanent residents. The court held that this provision was inconsistent with 
the Basic Law as interpreted in light of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights which is applicable to Hong Kong under article thirty-
nine of the Basic Law.  This ruling remains valid and the Hong Kong 
Government subsequently introduced an amendment66 to the legislation 
recognizing the right of abode of such illegitimate children.  In addition to 
this specific ruling, the general approach to the interpretation of the Basic 
Law enunciated by the CFA in Ng Ka Ling remains very much alive and has 
been relied upon in many subsequent judgments.  Thus the “purposive 
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approach” of constitutional interpretation as well as the approach of giving a 
“generous interpretation” to those provisions in the Basic Law that provide 
constitutional guarantees for fundamental rights and freedoms continue to be 
utilized in Hong Kong.67 
D. The Lau Kong Yung Case 
In December 1999, the CFA had the opportunity to determine the 
effect of the NPCSC’s interpretation on the Hong Kong legal system in the 
case of Lau Kong Yung v. Director of Immigration.68  In that case seekers of 
the right of abode argued that the interpretation should be disregarded since 
it was not issued in response to a request for interpretation by the CFA under 
article 158(3).  This argument was rejected by the court.  In a unanimous 
decision by the five-member court, the CFA held that the interpretation made 
by the NPCSC in June was binding on the Hong Kong courts.  It pointed out 
that the NPCSC’s power to interpret the Basic Law under article 158(1) of 
the Basic Law is a “free-standing” one,69 in the sense that it can be exercised 
at any time, even in the absence of a reference by the CFA.  Any 
interpretation issued by the NPCSC, whether on its own initiative or upon a 
reference by the CFA, is thus binding on the Hong Kong courts.  Applying 
the common law approach and English case law, the CFA held that the 
interpretation had a retroactive effect in the sense that the text of the 
interpretation states what the legal position should always have been since 
the Basic Law came into effect.  The CFA also acknowledged in Lau Kong 
Yung that since the preamble to the NPCSC interpretation suggests that a 
referral to the NPCSC for interpretation should have been made by the CFA, 
it might be necessary for the CFA to re-visit in the future, the test (such as 
the “predominant provision” test) for determining when such a referral 
should be made.  
Different assessments have been made of the CFA’s “constitutional 
repositioning”70 in Lau Kong Yung.  Professor Jerome Cohen opined that the 
CFA had moved “from one extreme to the other.”  He noted that “instead of 
again provoking the Central Government [as in Ng Ka Ling], [the CFA] 
unnecessarily prostrated itself before Beijing.”71 Professor Yash Ghai 
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discussed “the total capitulation by the Court to the Central Authorities” and 
“the excessive deference that the CFA has paid to the NPCSC.”72  On the 
other hand, Professor Benny Tai suggested that “the CFA did not have much 
choice,” and that the CFA’s stance in the Lau case was consistent with “its 
constitutional position as the guardian of the rule of law.”73 
The better view seems to be that the approach adopted by the CFA 
was the only approach consistent with the NPCSC’s power of interpretation 
of law under the Chinese Constitution74 and the Basic Law of the Hong 
Kong SAR.  The power of interpretation is not one that is exercised in 
deciding a case litigated before a court.  It is a legislative power75 and its 
exercise is governed by procedures similar to those applicable to law-
making by the NPCSC.76  The effect in practice of the promulgation of an 
interpretation by the NPCSC is virtually the same as if the law were 
amended by having the text of the interpretation incorporated into it.77  Thus, 
although the NPCSC’s enactment is called an interpretation, it performs the 
same function as a legislative enactment and does not operate like a court 
judgment.  
Given this system and the language of article 158 of the Basic Law 
(which does not provide any express limit on the scope of the NPCSC’s 
power of interpretation), the only conceivable way in which the CFA could 
have limited the scope of the power of interpretation would be to assert that 
the Hong Kong court may scrutinize whether an enactment which the 
NPCSC calls an interpretation of the Basic Law is indeed an interpretation 
of the Basic Law.  However, this would amount to competing with the 
NPCSC for the power to define the word “interpretation” in article 158 of 
the Basic Law.  Given the way article 158 of the Basic Law was drafted,78 it 
would seem that the Hong Kong courts do not have a secure legal basis for 
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“winning” the competition.  It is therefore submitted that the CFA’s approach 
in Lau Kong Yung was adopted not only because—as suggested by Professor 
Tai—politically the court had no other alternative, but also because this 
approach was mandated by the structure of the national constitutional system 
in which the Hong Kong courts are situated.  Given the context of “one 
country, two systems,” it would not have been possible for the Hong Kong 
CFA to assert the full jurisdiction of a national Supreme Court or 
constitutional court vis-à-vis the national parliament.  
The acknowledgement by the CFA in Lau Kong Yung, of the binding 
authority of the NPCSC interpretation of the Basic Law, even where the 
interpretation is not made pursuant to a referral by the CFA to the NPCSC, 
further explicates the position adopted by the CFA in its “clarification” of 
February 1999.  The full implication of article 158 of the Basic Law was 
now apparent: although the CFA has the power of final adjudication of cases 
while the NPCSC has no power to decide any case litigated in the Hong 
Kong courts, the NPCSC, at least in theory, may issue an interpretation of 
the Basic Law at any time, and thereupon the Hong Kong courts must follow 
such interpretation when they decide cases.  It follows that if the NPCSC 
were to exercise this overriding power frequently, the autonomy and 
authority of the Hong Kong courts in deciding cases on their own (at least in 
cases that touch upon an interpretation of the Basic Law) would be severely 
hampered.  Such an erosion of the common law system in Hong Kong would 
undermine local and international confidence in the Rule of law in Hong 
Kong. 
Fortunately, this has not happened.  The NPCSC has practiced a 
degree of self-restraint in exercising its power of interpretation of the Basic 
Law.  Since its interpretation of 1999, only two other interpretations have 
been promulgated, one in 2004 on the issue of political reform and 
democratization in Hong Kong and the Beijing authorities’ role in the 
process,79 and one in 200580 on the issue of the term of office of the 
successor to Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa who resigned in March 2005 
before completing his second term of office of 2002-07.81  The 2004 
interpretation was issued on the NPCSC’s own initiative in the absence of 
any litigation on the matter or any request for interpretation by the Hong 
Kong Government.  The 2005 interpretation was issued at the request of the 
Hong Kong Government at a time when litigation (to challenge a bill 
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introduced in the Hong Kong legislature on the Chief Executive’s term of 
office) was pending but before there had been a full trial in any court.  
Both interpretations were controversial and were resisted by many 
prominent figures in the legal community and the pro-democracy camp in 
Hong Kong.  The primary complaints were that the interpretations were 
motivated by political rather than jurisprudential considerations, and that 
they actually introduced additional content into the Basic Law and were 
effectively amendments to the Basic Law that bypassed the amendment 
procedure stipulated in article 159 of the Basic Law.  These criticisms are 
legitimate.  There is much to be said for invoking the amendment procedure 
to deal with the issues covered by the two interpretations.  Even though the 
ultimate power of amending the Basic Law is in the hands of the NPC, the 
amendment procedure at least provides for more transparency and room for 
public debate on the bill containing the proposed amendment.82  It seems 
that, as in the case of the 1999 interpretation, the amendment procedure was 
not adopted in these two cases mainly because an amendment would have 
had to wait until the next annual meeting of the NPC, while a timely 
interpretation by the NPCSC could more easily be made, as the latter meets 
at least once every two months in a session lasting a few days.  However, as 
this article focuses on constitutional adjudication by Hong Kong courts, 
these issues will not be further explored here. 
E. The Chong Fung Yuen Case 
The last major case decided by a Hong Kong court and dealing with 
the constitutional relationship between the Beijing authorities and the Hong 
Kong SAR is the CFA’s decision in Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung 
Yuen.83  This case may be said to symbolize the restoration of the self-
confidence of the Hong Kong courts after the “trauma” of 1999.  Moreover, 
the aftermath of this case demonstrated the spirit of accommodation and 
tolerance of the difference between the “two systems” on the part of the 
mainland authorities.  In Chong Fung Yuen, the issue was whether, under 
article 24(2)(1) of the Basic Law, the right of abode in Hong Kong vests in 
children born in Hong Kong to Chinese parents who are not Hong Kong 
                                           
82
 For the lack of transparency and other procedural defects in the current system for interpretation of 
the Basic Law by the NPCSC, see Ghai, supra note 42, at 50-51; Yash Ghai, The Imperatives of Autonomy: 
Contradictions of the Basic Law, in HONG KONG’S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 29, 39-41 (Johannes Chan 
& Lison Harris eds., 2005); Chen, supra note 80, at 263-64. 
83
 [2001] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 533 (C.F.A.).  The discussion of this case here draws on Albert H.Y. Chen, 
The Constitution and the Rule of Law, in THE FIRST TUNG CHEE-HWA ADMINISTRATION 69, 81-83 (Lau 
Siu-kai ed., 2002). 




residents but who are mainlanders visiting Hong Kong temporarily or 
illegally staying in Hong Kong.  A literal interpretation of article 24(2)(1) 
would read that such children are Hong Kong permanent residents and enjoy 
the right of abode.  The Preparatory Committee for the SAR in 1996, 
however, had suggested otherwise when it issued an opinion on the 
implementation of article 24.  In its June 1999 interpretation the NPCSC 
stated, inter alia, that the Preparatory Committee’s 1996 opinion “reflected” 
the “legislative intent” behind article 24(2) of the Basic Law.  The question 
for the CFA in Chong Fung Yuen was whether it should follow the views of 
the Preparatory Committee in this regard, given that such views had been 
affirmed in the text of the NPCSC’s interpretation of 1999. 
The CFA’s judgment in this case was an emphatic statement that when 
Hong Kong courts interpret the Basic Law, they should adopt the common 
law approach to interpretation, and do not need to resort to or otherwise take 
into account any principle or norm of the mainland legal system.  The 
common law approach gives effect “to the legislative intent as expressed in 
the language.”84  “Whilst the courts must avoid a literal, technical, narrow or 
rigid approach, they cannot give the language a meaning which the language 
cannot bear.”85  Applying the common law approach to interpretation in this 
case, the CFA held that there was only one possible answer to the legal 
question raised: the child concerned was entitled to the right of abode in 
Hong Kong.  As for the Preparatory Committee’s opinion, since it was 
issued years after the enactment of the Basic Law, it could hardly be 
regarded (from the common law perspective) as evidence of the legislative 
intent behind the Basic Law.  The CFA also did not attach any weight to the 
suggestion in the June 1999 interpretation by the NPCSC that the 
Preparatory Committee’s opinion reflected the legislative intent behind 
article 24 of the Basic Law.  The CFA stressed that this was an interpretation 
only of articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law.  It was not an 
interpretation of article 24(2)(1) of the Basic Law, which was the provision 
being interpreted in the Chong Fung Yuen case.  In the absence of any 
NPCSC interpretation of article 24(2)(1), the CFA was free to apply its own 
interpretation.  
In Chong Fung Yuen, the CFA rejected the Government’s argument 
that the interpretation of article 24(2)(1) should be referred to the NPCSC 
because the “implementation” of the provision would have a “substantive 
effect” on the relationship between the Hong Kong SAR and the Central 
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Authorities, or on affairs which are the responsibility of the Central 
Government.  The CFA held that in determining whether a referral to the 
NPCSC should be made, the court is to look at the character of the Basic 
Law provision concerned rather than the factual determination of the effect 
of its implementation.  Article 24(2)(1) concerns only the right of abode in 
Hong Kong of persons of Chinese nationality born in Hong Kong and makes 
no specific reference to the question of whether the parents of such persons 
are residents of Hong Kong, mainland China, or any other country.  Thus, 
the CFA held that the character of this provision is such that it does not 
concern the relationship between the Hong Kong SAR and the Central 
Authorities, or affairs which are the responsibility of the Central 
Government.  On this basis, the court held that article 24(2)(1) need not be 
referred to the NPCSC.  The court considered it unnecessary in this case to 
re-visit the “predominant provision” test for reference to the NPCSC, which 
was applied in Ng Ka Ling and which is only relevant when more than one 
Basic Law provision is at issue.  The Chong case concerned the 
interpretation of only one Basic Law provision. 
The CFA’s decision in Chong Fung Yuen was generally applauded by 
the legal community of Hong Kong,86 although there was some public 
concern about pregnant women from the mainland being induced to come to 
Hong Kong to give birth to their babies.  In a very unusual manner not seen 
since the constitutional crisis of February 1999, Beijing reacted publicly to 
the decision as well.  On July 21, 2001, the morning after the CFA’s 
decision, a spokesman from the Legislative Affairs Commission of the 
NPCSC pointed out in a widely reported press statement87 that the CFA’s 
decision in Chong Fung Yuen was “not consistent” with the NPCSC’s 
interpretation, and “expressed concern” about the matter.  Apart from this 
terse statement, however, no further action on the matter was taken by the 
Beijing side.  In particular, no interpretation on the issue was issued by the 
NPCSC. 
The statement of July 21, 2001 was an indication that the NPCSC 
wanted to distance itself from the CFA’s interpretation of article 24(2)(1), 
and suggested that if the NPCSC had interpreted the provision, it probably 
would have interpreted it differently.  The statement can also be understood 
as an expression of Beijing’s displeasure about the CFA’s lack of respect for 
the text of the NPCSC’s interpretation of June 1999, which, after all, did say 
that the Preparatory Committee’s opinion reflected the legislative intent 
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behind the whole of article 24(2).  Given these considerations, Beijing’s 
reaction to the Chong Fung Yuen decision must be considered a very muted 
one.  Utmost self-restraint was adhered to in order not to undermine the 
authority of the Hong Kong courts and public confidence in the Rule of law 
in Hong Kong.88   
In Chong, the CFA implicitly claimed for itself and exercised on its 
own the power to interpret the text of any NPCSC interpretation in the 
course of considering whether and how to apply it to a case before the court. 
It concluded—as a matter of interpretation—that as far as the particular text 
of June 1999 was concerned, it did not constitute an interpretation of article 
24(2)(1) of the Basic Law.  This conclusion is well justified on 
jurisprudential grounds.  The title of the June 1999 interpretation is “The 
Interpretation by the NPCSC of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law 
of the Hong Kong SAR.”  There is nothing either in the text of the 
interpretation itself, or in the explanatory speech89 made by Mr. Qiao 
Xiaoyang, the official introducing the bill for the interpretation to the 
NPCSC, that suggests that it constitutes an interpretation of any Basic Law 
provisions other than articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3).   
The CFA in Chong relied on a strategy commonly employed by courts 
in the common law world.  Although courts are bound by legislative texts in 
accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers (putting aside for the 
moment the question of constitutional judicial review), they jealously guard 
their power to interpret the text in the course of applying it.  Insofar as the 
text is ambiguous, the courts may resolve the ambiguity in a way they deem 
appropriate. On the other hand, where the legislature has spoken clearly and 
the text is unambiguous, the courts must apply the legislative text no matter 
how much they dislike it.  The NPCSC did not make clear that the June 1999 
interpretation constituted an interpretation of article 24(2)(1), or for that 
matter, any of the various limbs of article 24(2) other than article 24(2)(3).  
Under article 158 of the Basic Law, the Hong Kong courts are only bound by 
official interpretations issued by the NPCSC.  Hence the CFA could 
legitimately choose to ignore what the NPCSC had said about the 
Preparatory Committee’s views.  
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F. In Conclusion: The Jurisprudence of “One Country, Two Systems” 
The abovementioned cases represent the jurisprudence that has 
evolved thus far on the constitutional relationship between the Hong Kong 
SAR and the central governmental authorities in Beijing.  Unlike the 
complex jurisprudence governing the division of power between national 
and provincial authorities in federal systems, the jurisprudence of “one 
country, two systems” is relatively simple.  The NPCSC has supreme 
authority over the interpretation of the Basic Law—including Basic Law 
provisions governing the relationship between Hong Kong and Beijing, as 
well as provisions pertaining to Hong Kong’s domestic affairs—which it can 
exercise through the legislative process of interpretation.  Whether, when, 
and how it will exercise this power is not governed by law but is a matter of 
practice which is, or will hopefully be, governed by evolving constitutional 
conventions that supplement the written text of the Basic Law.90  
In the absence of any relevant interpretation by the NPCSC, the courts 
of Hong Kong are free to interpret the Basic Law on their own when 
adjudicating cases.  In doing this, they adhere to the common law approach 
of constitutional and statutory interpretation and do not take account of any 
mainland Chinese approach.  Any approaches to or theories underlying the 
interpretation of the Basic Law that may be implicit in the interpretations 
issued thus far by the NPCSC will not affect how Hong Kong courts 
interpret the Basic Law.  Interpretations of the Basic Law by the NPCSC 
operate in practice as legislative amendments to the Basic Law that 
nevertheless have the same retroactive effect as interpretations of the law 
contained in decisions by a common law court.91  The NPCSC’s 
interpretations have the same force as legislation once they are issued, but 
they cannot overturn any court judgment as far as the rights and interests of 
the parties to the litigation are concerned.   
Faced with the constitutional crisis that followed the CFA’s twin 
decisions of January 29, 1999, the Hong Kong courts under the CFA’s 
leadership have not attempted to resist or limit the authority of the NPCSC 
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to interpret the Basic Law, nor even the right of the Hong Kong SAR 
Government to request an NPCSC interpretation in the absence of an express 
Basic Law provision authorizing the SAR Government to do so.92  That does 
not mean, however, that the Hong Kong judiciary has betrayed the ideal of 
“one country, two systems” or has let it be turned into “one country, one 
system.”  While accepting the authority of the NPCSC to promulgate 
interpretations of the Basic Law, which (putting aside the issue of how 
article 158 should be interpreted, as argued in Lau Kong Yung) it is 
empowered to do under the PRC Constitution,93 the Hong Kong courts have 
developed a jurisprudence of treating such interpretations as no more than 
legislative pronouncements.  The courts have retained and continue to 
exercise the authority to interpret the Basic Law in accordance with those 
principles of interpretation that they themselves choose to adopt, so long as 
the relevant Basic Law provision has not been interpreted by the NPCSC.  
Furthermore, they have retained and continue to exercise the authority to 
interpret the meaning, scope, and effect of any NPCSC interpretation of the 
Basic Law, and to apply it to concrete cases, just as they have the authority 
to interpret any law in force in Hong Kong and to apply it to concrete cases.  
Thus, when it comes to what fate befalls the litigant in a particular case, the 
Hong Kong courts still have the last word. 
III. THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF HONG KONG PEOPLE 
This part will begin by explaining the history of the development of 
the constitutional framework for the protection of civil liberties and human 
rights in Hong Kong.  It will then review the leading cases decided by the 
Hong Kong courts since 1997 on several key domains of human rights, 
including freedom of speech and expression, freedom of assembly and 
procession, and the right to equality and non-discrimination.  It will 
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conclude with some reflections on the human rights jurisprudence developed 
by the Hong Kong courts in the post-1997 era.  
A. Historical Background and Constitutional Framework 
Apart from managing the relationship between different governmental 
organs, the other major task of constitutional adjudication is to safeguard the 
human rights and civil liberties of citizens and other individuals in the state.  
As mentioned in the introductory section of this article, since the enactment 
of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights in 1991, the courts of Hong Kong have 
practiced the art of reviewing the compatibility of executive acts and 
legislation with constitutional guarantees of human rights.  Their work in 
this regard has seen further progress in the post-1997 era.  The Basic Law 
has proved to be even more potent than the Hong Kong Bill of Rights in 
facilitating constitutional challenges by way of judicial review. 
Hong Kong’s pre-1997 constitution94 was contained in the Letters 
Patent issued by the British Crown.95  Before the 1991 amendment of the 
Letters Patent, the Hong Kong courts in theory enjoyed the power to review 
the constitutionality of local legislation, but in practice never had the 
opportunity to exercise that power.96  This was because the rudimentary 
Letters Patent did not contain any guarantee of civil liberties or human 
rights, nor did it set up any system of division of power as between the 
colonial government and the metropolitan government.   
In light of this background, what happened in 1991 can be regarded as 
the first constitutional revolution in Hong Kong—the second being, of 
course, the reversion to Chinese rule and the commencement of the 
operation of the Basic Law in 1997 (which involved a shift in the 
Grundnorm).97   In 1991, in an attempt to restore confidence in Hong 
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Kong’s future which had been deeply shaken by the Tiananmen incident,98 
the Hong Kong Government enacted the Hong Kong Bill of Rights 
Ordinance (“Ordinance”).99  The Ordinance incorporated into the domestic 
law of Hong Kong, the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights ("I.C.C.P.R.") which had already been applied by the British 
to Hong Kong on the level of international law since 1976.  The Ordinance 
expressly repealed all pre-existing legislation that was inconsistent with it.100  
At the same time, the Letters Patent were amended to give the I.C.C.P.R. 
supremacy over future ordinances enacted by the colonial legislature.101  As 
the Court of Appeal explained in 1994: 
The Letters Patent entrench the Bill of Rights by prohibiting 
any legislative inroad into the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights as applied to Hong Kong.  The Bill is  
the embodiment of the covenant as applied here.  Any 
legislative inroad into the Bill is therefore unconstitutional, and 
will be struck down by the courts as the guardians of the 
constitution.102 
The Bill of Rights and the corresponding amendment to the Letters Patent 
inaugurated the era of judicial review of legislation on the basis of 
constitutional guarantees of human rights.  The case law developed by Hong 
Kong courts during this period has been well documented.103  It 
demonstrates that Hong Kong courts had acquired considerable experience 
in judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation by the time the Basic 
Law came into force in July 1997.  They had introduced into Hong Kong 
law basic principles of constitutional review such as the principles of 
rationality and proportionality.  They had also adopted the approach to 
constitutional interpretation advocated by the Privy Council in cases such as 
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Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher104 and Attorney General of the Gambia v. 
Jobe,105 which was to give provisions on rights “a generous and purposive 
construction”106 and to avoid “the austerity of tabulated legalism.”107  
Generally speaking, the courts were more activist in judicial review in the 
early history of the Bill of Rights litigation, but subsequently leaned towards 
judicial restraint.108   
It is noteworthy that the legitimacy of judicial review in Hong Kong 
in this era was never queried.  It was evident that the kind of “counter-
majoritarian difficulty”109 that constitutional theorists encounter in the 
United States and other liberal democratic states was not relevant to colonial 
Hong Kong.  In the early 1990s, Hong Kong was just beginning its journey 
of democratization, with the first ever direct election on the basis of 
universal suffrage introduced in 1991 (the 1985 and 1988 elections were 
both on the basis of “functional constituencies” only).110  Most laws on the 
books had been enacted by a legislature that consisted solely of members 
appointed by the Governor.  In these circumstances, the use by the judiciary 
(though predominantly expatriate)111 of international and comparative 
human rights jurisprudence to review the constitutional validity of Hong 
Kong laws could only be a welcomed phenomenon for the local community. 
Although the colonial constitution embodied in the Letters Patent lost 
its force when the Hong Kong SAR was established, article eight of the 
Basic Law provides for the continued validity of laws previously in force in 
Hong Kong that are consistent with the Basic Law, subject to any 
amendment by the SAR legislature.  Under article 160 of the Basic Law, the 
NPCSC may declare which of Hong Kong’s pre-existing laws contravene 
the Basic Law and cannot therefore survive the 1997 transition.  This 
declaration was made by the NPCSC on February 23, 1997, in its Decision 
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on the Treatment of the Laws Previously in Force in Hong Kong.112 The 
Decision declared, inter alia, the non-adoption of three interpretative 
provisions in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance,113 apparently on the 
ground that they purported to give the Ordinance a superior status over other 
Hong Kong laws, a mandate that is inconsistent with the principle that only 
the Basic Law is superior to other Hong Kong laws. 
The operative force of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights and the Hong 
Kong courts’ power of judicial review of legislation on human rights 
grounds have survived the non-adoption of these provisions in the Hong 
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.   This is clear from the case law of the post-
1997 era, particularly the CFA’s decisions in Ng Kung Siu (on the freedom of 
expression) and Leung Kwok Hung (on the freedom of assembly and 
procession) discussed below.  The Hong Kong courts’ post-1997 approach to 
human rights protection, which has not been challenged by litigants or their 
lawyers in any case and thus represents the consensus of the legal 
community in Hong Kong, is basically as follows.  The courts may review 
any legislative or executive action for violations of the human rights 
guaranteed by Chapter III of the Basic Law or by the I.C.C.P.R. (the 
applicable provisions of which have, as mentioned above, been reproduced 
in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights) which is given effect by article thirty-nine 
of the Basic Law.  The courts114 have interpreted article thirty-nine to mean 
that the relevant provisions override laws that are inconsistent with these 
provisions.  In this regard reliance has been placed on article eleven of the 
Basic Law, which provides: “No law enacted by the legislature of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region shall contravene this Law.”  
The net effect of the commencement of the operation of the Basic 
Law in July 1997 and the Hong Kong courts’ interpretation of its judicial 
                                           
112
 For an English translation of this decision, see Albert H. Y. Chen, Legal Preparation for the 
Establishment of the Hong Kong SAR: Chronology and Selected Documents, 27 H.K.L.J. 419 (1997).  
113
 The interpretive provisions concerned were sections 2(3), 3 and 4 of the Ordinance. Section 2(3) 
provides that “[i]n interpreting and applying this Ordinance, regard shall be had to the fact that the purpose 
of this Ordinance is to provide for the incorporation into the law of Hong Kong of provisions of” the 
I.C.C.P.R. Section 3 provides that “[a]ll pre-existing legislation that admits of a construction consistent 
with this Ordinance shall be given such a construction”; “[a]ll pre-existing legislation that does not admit of 
a construction consistent with this Ordinance is, to the extent of the inconsistency, repealed.” Section 4 
provides that “[a]ll legislation enacted on or after the commencement date [of this Ordinance] shall, to the 
extent that it admits of such a construction, be construed so as to be consistent with” the I.C.C.P.R.  For the 
effect of the non-adoption of these provisions, see Peter Wesley-Smith, Maintenance of the Bill of Rights, 
27 H.K.L.J. 15 (1997); Johannes Chan, The Status of the Bill of Rights in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, 28 H.K.L.J. 152 (1998). 
114
 The relevant cases are discussed below. 




review power under the Basic Law has been a broadening of the grounds on 
which legislative and executive actions may be challenged by way of 
judicial review.  After 1991, but before 1997, it was possible to launch such 
a challenge on the basis of the provisions of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, 
which are identical to those provisions of the I.C.C.P.R. that are applicable to 
Hong Kong.  After 1997, a challenge may still be launched on this basis, but 
in addition, a challenge may also be based on other provisions of the Basic 
Law, particularly those which confer rights that are not expressly or 
adequately provided for in the I.C.C.P.R., such as the right of abode115 or the 
right to travel.116  In this section of the article, several leading cases on rights 
and liberties decided by the Hong Kong courts in the post-1997 era will be 
discussed in order to elucidate the courts’ approach to the constitutional 
protection of human rights in the context of “one country, two systems.”  
B. Freedom of Speech and Expression 
Freedom of speech and expression is one of the most fundamental 
civil liberties of the modern world.  It often provides a litmus test of the 
extent to which a society is free and open.  Hong Kong had the good fortune 
of being one of the freest societies in Asia during the pre-1997 decades of 
British colonial rule.  Free speech continued to flourish in the Hong Kong 
SAR after its establishment in 1997.  The following cases, which are the 
leading cases since 1997, illustrate how the courts have tackled the 
constitutional task of delineating the boundaries of free speech. They will be 
briefly introduced in chronological order.  
1. The Press Freedom Case 
In Wong Yeung Ng v. Secretary for Justice,117 Wong was the chief 
editor of Oriental Daily News, a popular newspaper which, at the time, had 
captured 53% of the newspaper market in Hong Kong.  He was convicted on 
two counts of contempt of court and sentenced to four months’ 
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imprisonment.118  He appealed to the Court of Appeal and challenged the 
contempt of court law under which he was convicted on the ground that it 
violated the constitutionally protected freedom of expression and freedom of 
press.  The two counts of contempt of court related respectively to a series of 
articles vehemently attacking the judiciary in abusive and scurrilous 
language (for biased decisions against and political persecution of the 
Oriental Daily newspaper) published in the newspaper in December 1997 
and January 1998, and a 24-hour “paparazzi” type pursuit and surveillance 
of a High Court judge conducted by reporters and photographers of the 
newspaper for three consecutive days in January 1998 (purportedly to 
“educate” the judge on the meaning of “paparazzi” which the judge had 
allegedly referred to in his judgment on a case involving the Oriental Daily 
and to “punish” him for the judgment).  The grievances the newspaper had 
against the judiciary stemmed from decisions of the Obscene Articles 
Tribunal and other courts against the newspaper regarding its publication of 
obscene and indecent materials.  There had also been a judicial decision 
unfavorable to the newspaper in a civil suit in which the Oriental Press 
Group sued Apple Daily—its main competitor—for copyright violation 
when the latter re-printed a photo published by Oriental.  The photo was of 
the singer Faye Wong revealing that she was pregnant, and was taken by an 
Oriental Daily reporter clandestinely at the airport in Beijing.  
Wong’s appeal was dismissed unanimously by the three-member 
bench of the Court of Appeal in February 1999.  It was pointed out that 
although the Basic Law, the I.C.C.P.R. and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights 
protect freedom of expression, one of the grounds recognized by the 
I.C.C.P.R. and the Bill of Rights on which this freedom may be limited, is 
that of “public order (ordre public).”119  The court held that this concept is 
wide enough to cover the due administration of justice and the maintenance 
of the authority of the judiciary.  The court further held that the restrictions 
on freedom of expression imposed by the contempt of court law—in 
particular, those portions of the law that prohibit “scandalizing the court” 
and interference with the administration of justice as a continuing process—
are justified and not inconsistent with the I.C.C.P.R. standards for freedom 
of expression.  The court followed New Zealand case law120 (rather than the 
different Canadian case law121) in holding that contempt is committed when 
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the publication or action entails a “real risk” (as distinguished from “real, 
substantial and immediate danger” as suggested by the Canadian case law) 
that public confidence in the administration of justice will be undermined or 
the administration of justice will be interfered with.  The court stressed that 
in determining what constitutes contempt of court and in choosing between 
varying interpretations of foreign case law, the local circumstances of Hong 
Kong should be taken into account.  In this regard, the court referred to “the 
relatively small size of Hong Kong’s legal system,” the ease of 
“communication with a very substantial proportion of the population,” the 
“special importance” in Hong Kong of “confidence in our legal system, the 
maintenance of the rule of law and the authority of the court,” the “frequent, 
if misconceived, expressions of anxiety in this respect,” and the fact that 
“the ordinary citizen in Hong Kong regards the court as his ultimate and sure 
refuge from injustice and oppression.”122 
Although the court decided against Wong in this case and chose to 
follow the more conservative New Zealand approach rather than the more 
liberal Canadian approach to the law of contempt of court, this case was not 
a deliberate attempt to restrict freedom of the press in post-1997 Hong Kong.  
The decision is explicable on the particular facts of the case, in which a 
coordinated and sustained campaign was launched by a newspaper to 
discredit the Hong Kong judiciary and to put pressure on individual judges.  
The “paparazzi” type pursuit of the judge clearly went far beyond acceptable 
norms of journalist behavior.  On the other hand, it may be questioned 
whether the court was too harsh in holding that the publication of the 
relevant articles in the newspaper also constituted contempt.  It is arguable 
that Hong Kong should follow Canadian and American law in this regard 
and allow greater freedom to criticize the courts.  By restricting the freedom 
to publish attacks on the judiciary in abusive and scurrilous language, the 
Wong case has indeed drawn a legal limit to possible criticisms of the 
judicial branch in Hong Kong.  On the other hand, it should be noted that in 
the post-1997 era, Hong Kong courts have never silenced criticisms of the 
executive or legislative branches of government, and the law of defamation 
has never been invoked by government officials against their critics.  
2. The Flag Desecration Case 
Later in the year, in December 1999—the month the CFA in Lau Kong 
Yung determined the effect of the NPCSC interpretation of June 1999—the 
CFA gave judgment in probably the most theoretically significant 
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constitutional case on civil liberties and human rights in the legal history of 
the Hong Kong SAR thus far.  In HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu,123 the defendants 
had participated in a demonstration in Hong Kong for democracy in China 
during which they displayed a defaced national flag (of the PRC) and a 
defaced regional flag (of the SAR).  They were subsequently charged with 
violations of section seven of the National Flag and National Emblem 
Ordinance and section seven of the Regional Flag and Regional Emblem 
Ordinance.  These sections prohibit desecration of the national and regional 
flags and emblems.  The former section was basically reproduced from 
article nineteen of the PRC Law on the National Flag and article thirteen of 
the PRC Law on the National Emblem.124 These two PRC laws were listed 
in Annex III to the Basic Law as among those mainland laws that are 
applicable to Hong Kong under article eighteen of the Basic Law.125 
The defendants were convicted by the magistrate; they were neither 
fined nor imprisoned, but bound over126 to keep the peace on a recognizance 
of HK$2000 for each of the two charges for 12 months.  They successfully 
appealed against their conviction before the Court of Appeal.  The court held 
that the sections under which they were charged were contrary to the 
guarantee of freedom of expression in article nineteen of the I.C.C.P.R. as 
applied by article thirty-nine of the Basic Law.  In the court’s opinion, the 
prohibition of desecration of the national or regional flag, being a restriction 
on freedom of expression, cannot be justified by any necessity to protect 
“public order (ordre public).”127  
The Government appealed the case to the CFA, which rendered its 
judgment on December 15, 1999.  The CFA unanimously allowed the 
appeal, and the impugned ordinances were upheld as constitutional and 
valid.  The CFA pointed out that the national and regional flags are important 
and unique symbols of the nation and of the Hong Kong SAR respectively.  
The court noted that the objective behind the flag desecration laws was to 
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uphold the societal and community interests in the protection of the flags.  
Such protection was held to fall within the concept of “ordre public” as used 
in the I.C.C.P.R.  The CFA concluded that the court below adopted too 
narrow a conception of “ordre public” which, in the context of the 
I.C.C.P.R., is not confined to the common law notion of maintaining law and 
order.  The CFA determined that “ordre public” should be construed more 
broadly to embrace notions of the “general welfare” and the “interests of the 
collectivity as a whole.”128  This conception of the public order is “an 
imprecise and elusive one,” and “must remain a function of time, place and 
circumstances.”129 
The next questions for the CFA were whether the flag desecration 
laws impose restrictions on the freedom of expression, and, if so, whether 
such restrictions can be justified on the ground that they are necessary for 
the protection of “ordre public” and proportionate to the objective sought to 
be achieved.  Here the court held that flag desecration is indeed “a form of 
non-verbal speech or expression,”130 and the impugned laws do constitute a 
restriction thereon.  The court pointed out however, that such restriction is 
only applicable to a particular mode of expression (i.e. flag desecration); the 
same message which the actor wants to express could still be freely 
expressed by other modes.131  It was therefore concluded that the “necessity” 
and “proportionality” tests had been satisfied.132   
It is noteworthy that the CFA took into account separation of powers 
considerations in its decision (e.g. giving “due weight to the view of the 
HKSAR legislature that the enactment of the National Flag Ordinance … is 
appropriate for the discharge of the Region’s obligation to apply the national 
law arising from its addition to Annex III [to the Basic Law] by the Standing 
Committee”133).  At the same time, the court stressed the importance of 
considerations of “time, place and circumstances”: 
The intrinsic importance of the national flag and the regional 
flag to the HKSAR as such unique symbols is demonstrated by 
the fact that at the historic moment on the stroke of midnight on 
1 July 1997, the handover ceremony in Hong Kong to mark the 
People’s Republic of China’s resumption of the exercise of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong began by the raising of the 
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national flag and the regional flag. . . .  Hong Kong is at the 
early stage of the new order following resumption of the 
exercise of sovereignty by the People’s Republic of China.  The 
implementation of the principle of “one country, two systems” 
is a matter of fundamental importance, as is the reinforcement 
of national unity and territorial integrity.  Protection of the 
national flag and the regional flag from desecration, having 
regard to their unique symbolism, will play an important part in 
the attainment of these goals.134 
Apart from its decision to uphold the flag desecration law, Ng Kung Siu is 
also significant because the CFA reaffirmed the power of the Hong Kong 
courts to review the constitutionality of Hong Kong legislation on human 
rights grounds, and, if necessary, to strike down such legislation.  Although 
no legislation was actually struck down by the CFA in this case, the 
constitutional review power that it has authoritatively affirmed is a potent 
one. 
The day the CFA delivered its judgment in Ng Kung Siu was a 
moment of great constitutional importance. The case must have been 
extremely difficult for the CFA.  At issue was more than striking a balance 
between the individual’s freedom of expression and the public and national 
interest in the protection of the national flag.  What was even more 
significant—although not discussed in the judgment of the court below—
was that the national flag desecration law challenged in this case had been 
enacted by the Hong Kong legislature for the purpose of implementing a 
national law which the NPCSC had decided to apply to Hong Kong.  If the 
CFA had determined that the flag desecration law constituted an unnecessary 
or disproportionate restriction on freedom of expression, it would then have 
to deal with the politically sensitive issue of whether a Hong Kong court could 
decline to enforce a national law made applicable to Hong Kong.  An 
affirmative answer would bring the Hong Kong courts into direct conflict 
with the NPCSC, and a constitutional crisis like that witnessed in early 1999 
would likely ensue.  Fortunately, the CFA did not have to tread this path of 
potential collision with Beijing.135 
As far as the structure of legal reasoning is concerned, two different 
routes would have been equally viable for the purpose of reaching a decision 
in this case.  The first route was the one actually taken by the CFA.  The 
second route would be as follows.  The CFA would first consider whether it 
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had the power to strike down a law enacted by the Hong Kong legislature to 
implement a national law that the NPCSC had decided to apply to Hong 
Kong.  If this question was answered in the negative, then it would be 
unnecessary to proceed further, and the appeal would be allowed.  If this 
question was answered in the affirmative, then the CFA would have to 
proceed to consider whether the flag-desecration laws constituted an 
unconstitutional restriction on freedom of expression.  
Logically, both routes were equally viable, and neither is logically 
preferable to the other.  Politically speaking, however, the first route was 
clearly preferable, because by taking this route, it might be possible to avoid 
the issue of whether the Hong Kong court may decline to enforce an 
applicable national law.  Route (a) being that actually taken by the CFA, it 
may be said that the CFA acted strategically in choosing the “line of least 
resistance” from the political point of view.  Furthermore, given the fact that 
even the American Supreme Court was divided five to four on the issue of 
whether the criminalization of flag desecration was unconstitutional,136 the 
CFA’s decision in Ng Kung Siu is defensible jurisprudentially, and is 
certainly consistent with the political reality of Hong Kong under “one 
country, two systems.” 
3. The Taxi Driver Case 
The next “free speech” case in the legal history of the Hong Kong 
SAR concerned a relatively trivial matter—foul language spoken by a taxi 
driver to his passenger.  In HKSAR v. Tsui Ping Wing,137 Tsui, a taxi driver, 
aggrieved by the shortness of the journey ordered by his passenger, verbally 
abused and insulted the passenger.  He was charged with the offense of not 
behaving “in a civil and orderly manner,” convicted by the magistrate, and 
fined HK$500.  He appealed to the Court of First Instance and argued that 
the law creating the offense was too vague and that it violated the 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and equality before the 
law in the Basic Law and the I.C.C.P.R.  The court dismissed the appeal in 
April 2000, holding that the impugned law was not too vague and that the 
restriction on freedom of expression imposed by it was justifiable and not 
excessive.  The court considered that the law served to protect the rights of 
others, the public order, and public morals (permissible grounds for 
restriction under article sixteen of the I.C.C.P.R.).  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court took into account the fact that a taxi driver needs a 
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license in order to operate, and that “Hong Kong’s reputation, to a not 
insignificant degree, depends on the manners of its taxi drivers. . . . [T]hey 
represent and epitomise Hong Kong’s standard of behaviour at street 
level.”138 
The Tsui case suggests that the use of foul language deserves a lower 
degree of constitutional protection than “political speech.” Not only is the 
validity of this conclusion hardly questionable, but the decision on the facts 
of the case is also reasonable and probably in line with community 
sentiments. 
4. The Defamation Case 
The “free speech” cases mentioned so far concern the boundary of the 
law of criminal punishment for speech and acts of expression such as flag 
desecration.  Free speech is also relevant in the context of civil law, 
particularly the law of defamation. In Cheng v. Tse Wai Chun,139 Albert 
Cheng and the other defendant in this case were hosts of a phone-in radio 
talk show.  Tse sued them for defamatory statements they made about him 
during the radio program, and the defendants raised the defense of fair 
comment. According to the English common law of defamation, if a 
defamatory comment consists of opinions genuinely held by the 
commentator on matters of public interest, and such opinions have some 
objective factual basis, then the commentator is not liable for defamation.  
However, this defense may be negated by the fact that the commentator was 
actuated by malice in making the comment.  In the Court of First Instance, 
the judge gave directions to the jury regarding these legal principles, and the 
jury found the defendants liable for defamation.  The defendants appealed to 
the Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal.  On further appeal to the 
CFA, the CFA held that the Court of First Instance had misdirected the jury 
on the law governing the defense of fair comment and ordered a new trial.  
The main judgment in the Cheng case was delivered by Lord Nicholls 
of Birkenhead, a member of the highest appellate court in England (the 
House of Lords in its judicial capacity), who served as a nonpermanent 
judge for the CFA in this case.140  The judgment affirmed the importance of 
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free discussion on matters of public interest and held that the defense of fair 
comment should be given a generous interpretation.  It redefined the 
meaning of the “malice,” which can negate the defense of fair comment.  
Before the CFA’s decision, some books and authorities in the common law 
world suggested that the maker of the defamatory statement would be 
regarded as having been actuated by malice if he had some improper and 
personal motive or objective when he made the statement, such as personal 
gain or to injure his enemy’s reputation.  The CFA held that so long as the 
defamatory statement satisfies the requirements of the defense of fair 
comment (as mentioned above), the “impurity” or moral dubiousness of the 
motive or purpose behind the statement would not of itself negate the 
defense.  This does not mean that evidence as to such motive or purpose is 
entirely irrelevant, for it may be used to show that the speaker did not 
genuinely and honestly hold the opinion expressed, in which case one of the 
essential elements of “fair comment” is missing. 
In 2000, Denis Chang S.C., one of Hong Kong’s most famous 
lawyers, posed the following question as the title of an article: “Has Hong 
Kong Anything Special or Unique to Contribute to the Contemporary World 
of Jurisprudence?”141  He gave an affirmative answer to the question, citing 
the Cheng case as part of the evidence.  In particular, he underscored the 
Chinese element in this contribution: 
The CFA’s decision, whilst rooted in the common law, has an 
added dimension which comes from the very fact that the Court 
which delivered it is on territory which is part of China and 
which is governed by the Basic Law.  The Court clearly did not 
see anything in the Basic Law which inhibited it from giving 
the right of fair comment (as an integral part of the freedom of 
speech) its full measure.  Quite the contrary, it adopted a 
generous approach and developed the right to a fuller measure 
than what the common law had generally been perceived to 
give.142 
Cheng is a landmark freedom-of-speech case and is likely to have an impact 
on other jurisdictions in the common-law world. 
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C. Freedom of Assembly and Procession 
The freedom of assembly, procession, and demonstration is closely 
related to the freedom of expression and is one of the hallmarks of civil 
society.  The number of demonstrations in Hong Kong in recent years, such 
as the one-half-million-person march on July 1, 2003, against the proposed 
national security bill to implement article twenty-three of the Basic Law 
(which was as a result postponed indefinitely),143 the annual vigil in memory 
of the victims of the June 4, 1989, massacre, and protests by Falun Gong 
practitioners against the persecution of their sect in mainland China, is 
testimony to the success of “one country, two systems” and the reality of 
political freedom and social openness in Hong Kong.  As far as the legal 
aspect of assemblies and demonstrations is concerned, two leading cases 
stand out in the post-1997 era, both of which reached the CFA in 2005. 
1. The Falun Gong Case 
The first case is Yeung May-wan v. HKSAR,144 concerning the 
prosecution of Falun Gong protesters in 2002.  In this case the police 
resorted to the law of obstruction of public places,145 traditionally used in 
Hong Kong against illegal hawkers in the streets, to deal with the 
demonstrators.  The case arose from a small-scale demonstration staged by 
sixteen Falun Gong activists146 outside the entrance to the Liaison Office of 
the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong on March 14, 2002.  
Because the number of demonstrators was small, there was no need under 
the Public Order Ordinance (discussed in the Leung case below) to notify the 
police in advance or to comply with procedural requirements, which are only 
applicable to assemblies involving more than fifty persons or processions 
involving more than thirty persons.  After the protesters refused to leave 
despite repeated police warnings, the police arrested them.  There was some 
physical violence during and after the arrests.   
The protesters were charged with obstructing a public place and 
obstructing or assaulting police officers in the execution of their duty.  In 
August 2002, after a twenty-seven-day trial, a magistrate judge convicted the 
protesters of the offenses charged, and they received fines ranging from 
HK$1300 to $3800.  They appealed to the Court of Appeal, which gave 
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judgment in November 2004.147  In a unanimous decision, the Court of 
Appeal held that due regard to the protection of the right of assembly should 
be given in applying the law of obstruction of public places.  The court 
overturned the conviction on the ground that the magistrate failed to address 
sufficiently whether the manner in which the protesters exercised their right 
of assembly was so unreasonable as to constitute an unlawful obstruction. 
The defendants lost on their appeal of the other charges and thus further 
appealed to the CFA on these issues.  
The appeal was successful.  On May 5, 2005, the CFA148 unanimously 
held that the arrests of the defendants were unlawful.  The police officers 
who carried out the arrests were not able to satisfy the court that they had 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the defendants had committed the 
offense.  The court stressed that the offense is not committed by mere 
obstruction.  The use of the public place or highway must be unreasonable; 
if there is a lawful excuse for the obstruction, no offense is committed.  The 
court held that in determining whether there was an unreasonable use or a 
legitimate excuse, the defendants’ right to peaceful assembly and 
demonstration should be given due weight.  The court further held that the 
defendants in the present case could not be convicted for obstructing or 
assaulting police officers in the execution of their duty even though physical 
resistance was involved.  Since the arrest was unlawful, the police officers 
were not actually acting defendants.  The court noted that citizens have a 
right to use reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest and detention. 
The political significance of the Yeung case exceeds its constitutional 
and legal significance.  The case is politically significant because it 
concerned a demonstration staged by the Falun Gong group, which has been 
under intense and continuous persecution in mainland China since 1999,149 
outside of the highest representative office of the Beijing government in 
Hong Kong.  Indeed, the police intervention on the day of the demonstration 
was prompted by a complaint made by staff of the Liaison Office of the 
Central Government.  The ultimate acquittal for the Falun Gong activists 
was therefore an important symbolic victory for the sect in its struggles 
against Beijing.  It also testifies to the equality of all—including the most 
vocal opponents of the Chinese government—before the law in Hong Kong, 
as well as the independence of the judiciary and the rigorous legal protection 
of human rights in the SAR.  
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From the legal point of view, however, the case is of less 
constitutional significance than the national-flag case discussed above or the 
Public Order Ordinance case discussed below.  The Falun Gong case did not 
involve judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation.  The 
demonstrators were prosecuted mainly for obstruction of a public place, 
which is a statutory offense that on its face does not directly concern 
freedom of demonstration and has traditionally been used only against 
hawkers in the streets. The CFA’s decision exemplifies the successful use of 
familiar techniques of statutory construction for the purpose of advancing a 
constitutional right.  It was particularly significant in enhancing the right to 
assembly and procession in Hong Kong where the number of demonstrators 
does not exceed fifty (in the case of an assembly) or thirty (in the case of a 
procession) as stipulated in the Public Order Ordinance, to which we now 
turn.  
2. The Public Order Ordinance Case 
The next case, Leung Kwok Hung v. HKSAR,150 concerned a 
demonstration of a slightly larger scale than that in Yeung.  As mentioned 
above, the Public Order Ordinance requires organizers of demonstrations to 
notify the police in advance of the event. The ordinance also empowers the 
police to prohibit the proposed demonstration on certain specified grounds 
or to impose conditions which demonstrators must comply with.151  In 
theory, demonstrators must comply with the rule regarding prior 
notification.152  In practice, however, the rule has often been ignored.  Many 
demonstrations took place without complying with this rule, and yet the 
organizers or demonstrators were not prosecuted.153 
In 2002, the SAR Government attempted for the first time to enforce 
the notification rule.  In May 2002, Leung Kowk-hung, a political activist 
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(who was subsequently elected as a member of the Legislative Council in 
2004) and two student activists were arrested by the police and charged with 
organizing an unauthorized procession.154  The number of people 
participating in the procession varied at different points in time but was 
between 40 and 96.155  The three defendants were convicted by a magistrate 
in November 2002 and were required to be bound over for three months on a 
recognizance for HK$500 (i.e. to undertake that they would be of good 
behavior and not violate the law during this period; the breach of the 
undertaking would result in a fine of $500).156  The defense lawyers’ 
challenge to the constitutionality of the Public Order Ordinance was 
unsuccessful.  The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal.  In 
November 2004, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by a majority 
ruling of two to one.157  The majority held that the relevant provisions of the 
Ordinance were consistent with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and 
procession in the Basic Law, the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, and the 
I.C.C.P.R..  The dissenting judge, however, was of the view that the power 
conferred by the Ordinance on the police to prohibit or impose restrictions 
on demonstrations on, inter alia, the ground of “public order (ordre 
public)”158 was problematic.  The judge felt that it was framed in such a way 
as to fail the requirement of legal certainty, and that it also failed the 
“necessity” test which requires that any restriction of the right of assembly 
and procession be necessary.  The case was appealed to the CFA. 
On July 8, 2005, the CFA, by a majority of four to one, dismissed the 
appeal.159  The court basically steered a middle course between the majority 
and minority views in the court below.  It upheld the requirement in the 
Ordinance that organizers of public processions involving more than thirty 
persons should notify the police in advance.  It pointed out that prior 
notification would not only enable the police to take steps to safeguard 
public order during the demonstration, but would also be in the interests of 
the demonstrators.  It stated that “notification is required to enable the Police 
to fulfill the positive duty resting on Government to take reasonable and 
appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to take place 
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peacefully.”160 The court opined that such notification requirement is 
widespread in other jurisdictions.  
The court upheld the authority of the police to restrict processions on 
the ground of “public order” in the “law and order” sense of the word but 
rejected as unconstitutional, the broader concept of “ordre public” as used in 
the Ordinance.  The court determined that the concept was too broad and 
imprecise to satisfy the test of legal certainty.  Here the court drew a 
distinction between the concept of “ordre public” as part of a constitutional 
norm (enshrined in the I.C.C.P.R. which is applicable to Hong Kong under 
article thirty-nine of the Basic Law) and the same concept as part of a norm 
in legislation to implement the constitution.  While it is legitimate for “ordre 
public” to be used as a constitutional norm (the CFA itself applied it in Ng 
Kung Siu to review the constitutionality of the flag desecration law), this 
concept as used in the Public Order Ordinance failed to give a sufficient 
indication of the circumstances in which the police may restrict the right to 
freedom of demonstration.  Therefore, insofar as the Public Order Ordinance 
provided that “ordre public” constituted a ground for restricting the freedom 
of demonstration, it failed to conform to the constitutional requirement that 
any restriction of this right must be “prescribed by law,” which imports a 
high requirement in terms of the certainty of the meaning and the 
predictability of the operation of the law concerned.  
The court also stressed that in exercising discretionary power to 
regulate processions, the police must comply with the “proportionality” test.  
This test mandates that the police “must consider whether a potential 
restriction is rationally connected with one or more of the statutory 
legitimate purposes [public order as narrowly defined above, national 
security, public safety, etc.] and whether the potential restriction is no more 
than is necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose in question.”161  
Furthermore, “[w]here the Commissioner [of Police] decides to object [to a 
notified procession] or to impose conditions, the reasons given must be 
sufficient to show that he has properly applied the proportionality test in 
making his decision.”162  The discretionary power to control demonstrations 
“is thus not an arbitrary one but is a constrained one.”163  The manner in 
which it is exercised in a particular case can be subject to judicial review on 
the basis of the principles enunciated by the CFA in this case.  
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The dissenting judge, Justice Bokhary, agreed that it is legitimate to 
impose a prior notification requirement on processions, but disagreed with 
the view that this requirement can be enforced by criminal sanctions.  He 
also believed that the police power of prior restraint of demonstrations is 
unconstitutional. 
The primary significance of Leung lies in the fact that it goes beyond 
the traditional “Wednesbury unreasonableness” principles of judicial review 
of administrative action in English administrative law,164 and enunciates 
clearly the application of the “proportionality” principle to police decisions 
on any restriction of the citizen’s right to demonstrate.  In this way the 
decision makes a major contribution to the advancement of the freedom of 
demonstration in the Hong Kong SAR.  The majority's legal reasoning on 
whether the statutory scheme for the control of demonstrations was 
constitutional however, is not completely convincing, particularly when 
compared with the dissent. Justice Bohkary’s conclusion that it is 
unconstitutional to attach penalties to the requirement of advance 
notification of processions (the stipulated maximum of which are severe 
sanctions of criminal punishment165) has much persuasive force.  
Regrettably, the majority judgment did not discuss this issue at all but 
instead chose to focus its constitutional analysis on “ordre public” as a 
possible ground for the restriction of the freedom of demonstration, a mere 
subsidiary question compared to that posed by the dissent.  
Although the majority decision lacks legal rigor in this respect, it 
makes practical sense in the context of the actual operation of the regulation 
of demonstrations in Hong Kong.  As discussed above, the law on 
notification has seldom been rigorously enforced, and in practice those who 
give advance notification of demonstrations to the police will invariably 
obtain approval for their activities.  Given this reality, the majority in the 
CFA probably concluded that it made more practical sense to subject police 
actions regulating demonstrations to the proportionality test, rather than to 
strike at the fundamentals of the existing system of regulation by using 
criminal sanctions to enforce the regulatory requirements.    
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In both Falun Gong and the Public Order Ordinance case, the CFA 
stressed the importance of the constitutional right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and demonstration.  As the CFA put it at the opening of its 
judgment in Falun Gong: 
The freedom to demonstrate is a constitutional right. It is 
closely associated with the freedom of speech. These freedoms 
of course involve the freedom to express views which may be 
found to be disagreeable or even offensive to others or which 
may be critical of persons in authority.  These freedoms are at 
the heart of Hong Kong’s system and it is well established that 
the courts should give a generous interpretation to the 
constitutional guarantees for these freedoms in order to give to 
Hong Kong residents their full measure.166 
The CFA’s decisions in the two cases may be interpreted as a recognition, 
consolidation, and to some extent expansion of the freedom of 
demonstration in the Hong Kong SAR.  Collectively they epitomize the 
vibrancy of the life of the law and the spirit of human rights in Hong Kong 
and reveal the deeper meaning of “one country, two systems.”  
D. The Right to Equality and Non-discrimination 
Equal protection under the law and non-discrimination are core 
elements of the modern concept of human rights.  In Hong Kong, the 
constitutional principles of equal opportunity and non-discrimination were 
introduced in the 1990s by the Hong Kong Bill of Rights and amplified by a 
series of anti-discrimination laws such as the Sex Discrimination Ordinance.  
In the post-1997 era, the courts of Hong Kong have further developed the 
jurisprudence of equal rights and non-discrimination.  The two following 
cases are the most well known in this regard.  
Secretary for Justice v. Chan Wah and Tse Kwan Sang167 was a 
politically controversial case.  The legal arguments of Chan and Tse, 
however, were so persuasive that they won in all three courts—the Court of 
First Instance, the Court of Appeal, and the CFA.  The litigation concerned 
local village elections in Hong Kong’s New Territories (“NT”), a part of 
Hong Kong that is partly urbanized but still consists mainly of rural areas.  
Some of the residents of the villages of the NT are known as “indigenous 
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inhabitants” or “indigenous villagers” (defined168 as those descended 
through the male line of residents in the year 1898 of villages in the 
geographical area the British colonizers called the New Territories).  In 1898 
the British colony of Hong Kong—then comprising Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon Peninsula—was expanded to include the New Territories north of 
Kowloon.  Unlike Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, which were sparsely 
populated at the time of colonization, Chinese peasants had lived in the NT 
for many centuries before the territories came under British rule.  The British 
colonial government recognized to a significant extent the existing land 
rights of the Chinese peasants in the NT at the time of colonization.  The 
concept of “indigenous inhabitants” was therefore created and receives 
recognition in the Basic Law itself.  Article forty of the Basic Law, for 
example, provides that “[t]he lawful traditional rights and interests of the 
indigenous inhabitants of the ‘New Territories’ shall be protected by the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”169 
The villages in the NT had for decades operated their own system of 
election of village representatives (“VR”).  The VR of a village is a member 
of the Rural Committee of the area in which the village is situated.  There 
are a total of twenty-seven Rural Committees, which are linked to higher 
levels of government in the NT and the political system of Hong Kong (in 
which all Hong Kong permanent residents have voting rights).  The rules 
governing such elections in most villages limited the right to vote and the 
right to stand as candidates to indigenous inhabitants.  In the Chan case, 
Chan and Tse were non-indigenous inhabitants of the villages in which they 
lived.  They challenged the electoral rules as discriminatory because the 
rules denied them the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs under 
article 21(a) of the Bill of Rights (article twenty-five of the I.C.C.P.R.). 
In the final judgment170 delivered in December 2000, the CFA held 
that the impugned electoral rules in this case imposed unreasonable 
restrictions on Chan’s and Tse’s right to take part in public affairs through 
freely chosen representatives.  It also held that article forty of the Basic Law 
did not give indigenous inhabitants the political rights to vote and to stand as 
candidates in elections for VRs to the exclusion of others.  In explaining its 
decision, the court noted that there were approximately 600 villages in the 
NT.  It pointed out that the composition of the population of villages has 
changed in recent decades, with the migration away from the villages of 
many indigenous inhabitants and the migration into the villages of people 
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from other parts of Hong Kong.  Thus, in the village where Chan lived, there 
were approximately 400 indigenous inhabitants and 300 non-indigenous 
inhabitants.  In Tse’s village, 470 out of nearly 600 villagers were non-
indigenous.  The court pointed out that the VRs performed many functions, 
some of which related only to indigenous inhabitants and some of which 
related to all residents of the village, so that in relation to the latter the VRs 
should serve or represent the interests of all villagers as a whole.  It was 
therefore, unreasonable for the electoral rules to deny voting rights to non-
indigenous villagers.  The CFA's decision caused the Government to reform 
the village election system by introducing legislation providing for a dual 
system in which each village would elect two VRs, one serving only the 
indigenous inhabitants, and the other all the villagers.171 
While Chan concerned discrimination on the basis of origin or status, 
Equal Opportunities Commission v. Director of Education172 dealt with 
gender discrimination.  In that case, the Equal Opportunities Commission, a 
statutory body established by the Government in 1996 to promote equal 
rights and non-discrimination, challenged the Education Department’s policy 
regarding the allocation of secondary school places to students completing 
primary school education.  The system had been in operation since 1978, but 
the mechanics of the system did not become widely known until 1998, when 
the Equal Opportunities Commission began to receive complaints from 
parents.  The effect of the operation of this system was that boys stood a 
better chance of admission to a preferred secondary school than did girls, 
despite equal academic merits.  The policy was based on findings that girls’ 
academic achievements (as measured by scores) at the time of completion of 
primary education were on average higher than boys because girls' 
intellectual development moves more quickly at that age.  The policy was 
therefore designed to ensure a more balanced ratio between male and female 
students in the elite schools.  
The Court of First Instance held that the Education Department’s 
policy was discriminatory as against female students and that the 
discrimination was not justified by any of the reasons advanced by the 
Department.  Referring to article twenty-five of the Basic Law, article 
twenty-two of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, the Sex Discrimination 
Ordinance, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, which was extended to Hong Kong in 1996, 
the court stressed that the right to equal treatment was a fundamental right of 
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the individual that could not easily be subordinated to considerations of 
“group fairness”173 or the desire to attain a better balance in schools between 
boys and girls.  Any restriction of the girls’ right against discrimination in 
this case had to pass the stringent standards of the “proportionality test”174 in 
order to be justified.  After examining the Government’s arguments and the 
evidence submitted by it, the court held that the impugned scheme of 
allocation of school places failed the test.175  As a result of this decision, the 
Education Department changed its original policy.  
Both cases above concern matters of public policy; their ramifications 
extend far beyond the individual litigants or complainants in the cases. They 
demonstrate the increasingly significant role of the courts in Hong Kong in 
shaping social policy and in promoting social reform by employing 
jurisprudential concepts—in these two cases the fundamental human right to 
the equal protection of the law without discrimination.  
E. In Conclusion: Bill of Rights Jurisprudence Under “One Country, 
Two Systems” 
The human rights jurisprudence of the Hong Kong SAR neither 
started from a clean slate, nor was it created instantaneously.  Instead, 
constitutional adjudication on human rights issues in Hong Kong has a 
history dating back to the enactment of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights 
Ordinance in 1991.  The accumulated judicial experience of 1991-1997 
provides a secure foundation for the constitutional protection of human 
rights in the post-1997 era.  
As discussed above, despite an attempt by the NPCSC at the time of 
the 1997 handover to tamper with the content of the Hong Kong Bill of 
Rights Ordinance, the courts have ensured, through interpretation of the 
Basic Law, that the power of judicial review of the constitutionality of 
legislation on human rights grounds would remain intact.  The NPCSC has 
not intervened and thus has acquiesced in the Hong Kong courts’ post-1997 
practice of constitutional review in the protection of human rights.   
Hong Kong courts have by no means been conservative in the post-
1997 era of constitutional adjudication.  In Chan Wah, the CFA promoted 
equal rights and mandated a fundamental reform of the existing system of 
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village elections.  In the Equal Opportunities Commission case, the court 
again outlawed discriminatory practices and pushed for comprehensive 
reform of the existing system of allocation of secondary school places.  In 
the Falun Gong case, the CFA acquitted the demonstrators by interpreting 
the law of obstruction liberally.  In the Public Order Ordinance case, the 
CFA exercised the power of constitutional review of legislation to strike 
down the “ordre public” provision in the Public Order Ordinance, and 
subjected police actions under the ordinance to the principles of 
proportionality.  Finally, in Cheng v. Tse, the CFA liberalized the defense of 
fair comment in the common law of defamation in a way that was without 
precedent in the common law world.  
Similar to the pre-1997 era, the Hong Kong courts have not been 
radically liberal in the post-1997 era.  Thus, in Wong Yeung Ng, the Court of 
Appeal chose a more traditional common law version of the law of contempt 
of court then the liberal version adopted in North America.  In the Public 
Order Ordinance case, the CFA tolerated the continued existence of a system 
for control of demonstrations that relied on criminal sanctions for its 
enforcement.  In the flag desecration case, the CFA declined to follow the 
more liberal American approach and was sensitive to the political and 
ideological tensions within “one country, two systems.” 
IV. THE IMPACT OF “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS” ON MAINLAND CHINA  
For believers in constitutionalism, the highest hope is that the 
constitutional discourse as recounted above in this article regarding the 
Hong Kong Basic Law and human rights issues in the “one country, two 
systems” framework will not only serve to consolidate constitutionalism in 
Hong Kong but will also contribute to the development of constitutionalism 
in China and the search for a constitutional solution to the tension across the 
Taiwan Straits.   
Comparative scholars of constitutional law have distinguished 
between nominal, semantic, and normative constitutions.176  The 
constitutions in Communist states are generally nominal or semantic as 
opposed to normative constitutions “actually governing the dynamics of the 
power process instead of being governed by it.”177  In Marxist-Leninist states 
such as the People’s Republic of China, the supremacy of the Communist 
Party means that the constitution and the law are not supreme.  This is 
particularly true where there is a conflict between decisions and actions of 
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the party leadership and the formal requirements and procedures prescribed 
by law.  In the case of China, although the current Constitution, enacted in 
1982, provides for a functional division of powers among legislative, 
executive, judicial and procuratorial organs, all such organs are subject to 
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.178  The high degree of 
concentration of power in party leaders and party organs, the limited extent 
of judicial independence,179 the lack of any court or specialized tribunal 
having the power of constitutional adjudication,180 and the weakness of 
independent civil actors capable of exercising checks and balances against 
the Communist Party-State are all factors that tend to minimize the relevance 
of the constitution as a device to contain, structure, or direct the operation of 
political forces and to safeguard citizens’ rights.181  Despite constitutional 
amendments, introducing concepts like the Rule of law, human rights, and 
private property rights into the Constitution,182 mainland China today can 
hardly be called a constitutional state.  
Most of the political and social factors militating against 
constitutionalism in mainland China do not exist in Hong Kong.  Under “one 
country, two systems,” the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR is a normative 
rather than a merely semantic constitutional document.  This article 
demonstrates how much the Basic Law means to the people of Hong Kong, 
how seriously it is taken in practice, and how it is actually enforced by a 
robust and independent judiciary in Hong Kong.  Hong Kong may therefore 
serve as a beacon of constitutionalism in a country where constitutionalism 
is under-developed.  So can Taiwan, where constitutionalism has thrived 
under the leadership of an activist Constitutional Court since 
democratization in the late 1980s.183  It is to be hoped that scholars, leaders 
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and others in mainland China will gradually learn more from Hong Kong 
and Taiwan about how constitutionalism can contribute to a better Chinese 
society in which human beings live in the full dignity accorded them by the 
doctrine of human rights.  If the original objective of the theory of “one 
country, two systems” which Deng Xiaoping developed for Taiwan in the 
late 1970s and applied to Hong Kong in the early 1980s was to contribute to 
China’s unification and economic modernization, Deng probably under-
estimated the full potential of OCTS.  For OCTS may have a role to play in 
contributing to China’s political and constitutional modernization as well.  
V. CONCLUSION:  THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE HONG KONG JUDICIARY IN 
THE POST-1997 ERA  
In concluding an article written not long after the constitutional crisis 
of 1999, I drew an analogy between courts learning to cope with a new 
constitutional environment and children learning to walk:  
Hong Kong is a latecomer to the world of constitutional 
interpretation and judicial review, and she has only started the 
journey of her constitutional history as an autonomous part of 
China.  The child is learning to walk; she stumbles, she falls, 
she rises again; she staggers, and she then moves forward with 
greater confidence and more hope.  So hope abides; and 
learning never ends.184 
Six years since this passage was written, the record of the Hong Kong courts 
as covered in this article shows that the hope expressed in the passage was 
not misplaced.  Hong Kong courts have coped well with the challenges of 
constitutional adjudication.  After experiencing a steep learning curve 
initially, they have now reached a line of steady growth, a state of increasing 
confidence and growing maturity.  Lord Irvine of Lairg QC, Lord Chancellor 
of Britain, described the early record of the British courts in interpreting and 
applying the Human Rights Act 1998 as follows: “[T]he overriding theme 
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that emerges is balance: balance between scrutiny and deference; between 
the individual and the community; and between interpretation and 
declarations of incompatibility.”185  I believe exactly the same may be said 
of the overall performance so far of the Hong Kong courts in constitutional 
adjudication in the post-1997 era. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this article, the Hong Kong courts 
in the new constitutional order established by the Basic Law faced the dual 
challenge of managing the constitutional relationship between the Hong 
Kong SAR and the central state organs in Beijing, and of serving as guardian 
of the civil liberties and human rights of the people of Hong Kong.  As far as 
the first challenge is concerned, there has not been any concrete dispute 
regarding the respective competence of the SAR government and the central 
government which the Hong Kong courts have been called upon to resolve. 
The constitutional drama has revolved instead around the power of 
interpretation of the Basic Law under article 158.  The significance of this 
issue was well described by Sir Anthony Mason: 
In a nation-wide common law system, the link would normally 
be between the regional courts and the national constitutional 
court or the national Supreme Court.  Here, however, there are 
not only two different systems, but also two different legal 
systems.  In the context of “one country, two systems[,]” . . . 
Article 158 of the Basic Law provides a very different link.  
That is because the Article, in conformity with Article 67(4) of 
the PRC Constitution, vests the general power of interpretation 
of the Basic Law . . . in the NPC Standing Committee.  
Consistently with that vesting . . . the Standing Committee 
authorizes the courts of the Region to interpret “on their own, in 
adjudicating cases” the provisions of the Basic Law which are 
within the limits of the autonomy of the Region.186 
The major constitutional controversy in the post-1997 era relates to 
the relationship between the respective powers of Basic Law interpretation 
of the NPCSC and the Hong Kong courts.  As discussed in this article, the 
courts of Hong Kong led by the Court of Final Appeal have accepted 
unconditionally the “free-standing” power of the NPCSC to promulgate 
interpretations of the Basic Law irrespective of whether the CFA has 
requested an interpretation.  At the same time, the courts have courageously 
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defended their prerogative to apply the common law approach to the 
interpretation of the Basic Law in the absence of any relevant NPCSC 
interpretation.  They have also rejected any suggestion187 that in performing 
the task of interpretation, the Hong Kong courts should put themselves in the 
position of the NPCSC and seek to reach an interpretation which the NPCSC 
would itself be inclined to make.  
There is a Chinese saying, “bukang bubei,” which may be translated 
as “neither too proud nor too humble.”  I believe this is the appropriate 
characterization of the approach adopted by the Hong Kong courts in 
tackling their constitutional relationship with the Beijing authorities.  In the 
words of the “clarification” of 1999, the courts do “not question the 
authority of the Standing Committee to make an interpretation under article 
158 which would have to be followed by the courts of the Region”; neither 
do they “question the authority of the National People’s Congress or the 
Standing Committee to do any act which is in accordance with the 
provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure therein.”188  In the wide realm 
on which the NPCSC has not exercised its power of interpretation, however, 
the courts of Hong Kong and the common law system are still in complete 
control.  In practice the NPCSC exercises self-restraint and thus implicitly 
recognizes the high degree of judicial autonomy in Hong Kong.  
With regard to the second constitutional challenge, adjudicating the 
rights of the Hong Kong people, the courts have steered a middle course 
between judicial activism and judicial restraint.  The tenor of their decisions 
may be described as moderately liberal — neither radically liberal nor 
conservative.  They have built upon their experience since 1991 of judicial 
review of legislative and administrative actions on the basis of the I.C.C.P.R. 
(as reproduced in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights), and have continued the 
work of borrowing foreign jurisprudence in order to keep pace with 
contemporary international trends.  
These positive evaluations of the performance of the Hong Kong 
courts in the post-1997 era will likely be disputed, particularly by 
“fundamentalists” of the Rule of law and human rights.189  They would 
probably argue that the courts have not done enough or should have done 
more (a) in standing up to Beijing on issues of the constitutional relationship 
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between Beijing and Hong Kong, and (b) in promoting the cause of civil 
liberties and human rights in Hong Kong.  On point (a), they would likely 
criticize the CFA for acceding to the Government’s request for 
“clarification” after Ng Ka Ling was decided.  They might also question 
whether the CFA in Lau Kong Yung conceded too much to Beijing in not 
setting any limiting conditions for the recognition of interpretations made by 
the NPCSC.  On (b), they would probably question whether the flag 
desecration case was rightly decided and whether the decision was 
politically motivated to placate Beijing; and they would probably prefer 
Justice Bokhary’s dissent to the majority judgment in the Public Order 
Ordinance case.  
In discussing the cases in this article, I have tried to analyze the 
courts’ decisions and explain to what extent they were acceptable and 
reasonable.  A more general point can be made here: in assessing the 
performance of the Hong Kong courts in the post-1997 era, due account 
should be taken of the constitutional and political context in which the courts 
operate.  Constitutional jurisprudence is necessarily tailored to the particular 
configuration of legal, political, and social circumstances to which the 
constitution applies.  In the case of Hong Kong, the constitutional instrument 
is the Basic Law, and the legal and political context is that of “one country, 
two systems.”  In developing Hong Kong’s constitutional jurisprudence, the 
courts cannot focus only on the autonomy of the Hong Kong SAR under the 
“two systems” limb of the formula; they need also to give due weight to the 
“one country” limb of the formula, which in the Basic Law is mainly 
expressed in the form of the sovereign authority of the NPC and the NPCSC. 
In making the “clarification” to Ng Ka Ling and in rendering the 
judgment in Lau Kong Yung, the CFA has given full recognition to the 
overriding authority of the NPCSC to interpret the Basic Law.  I do not think 
the CFA can be faulted for doing so.  Given the nature of the Chinese 
constitutional system in which the NPC and the NPCSC enjoy plenary 
powers similar to those of the British Parliament under the doctrine of 
Parliamentary supremacy,190 and given the nature of the interface established 
by the Basic Law between the Chinese constitutional system and the Hong 
Kong SAR, the Hong Kong courts have no choice but to recognize the “free-
standing” power191 of the NPCSC to interpret the Basic Law.  This results in 
a situation in which only self-restraint as a matter of practice on the part of 
the NPCSC, rather than constitutional principles enforceable in a Hong 
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Kong court, can preserve judicial autonomy in Hong Kong.  The situation 
may be unsatisfactory, but then the “fault” lies in the structural design of the 
Basic Law rather than the performance of the Hong Kong judiciary.  
As to whether the courts have performed well as guardians of human 
rights, it seems that the decisions discussed in this article are generally in 
line with community sentiments.  For example, flag desecration and the 
freedom to engage in such an act have not become contentious issues in 
public opinion in Hong Kong; the CFA’s decision in Ng Kung Siu has not 
been met with significant criticism.  There has also been no suggestion that 
the CFA in the Public Order Ordinance case has failed to defend freedom of 
assembly in Hong Kong. 
While a positive assessment192 has been provided in this article of the 
performance of the Hong Kong courts in the post-1997 era, due credit also 
should be given to the institutional and social environment in which the 
courts have operated.  Although Hong Kong is not yet a full democracy by 
Western standards, it does have a government committed to the Rule of law 
and respectful of judicial decisions.  It is also blessed with a vibrant civil 
society, a strong middle class, a free media, active party politics, and 
dedicated lawyers and politicians skilled in the art of legal argumentation.  
Most important of all, it has a population that is sensitive to legal issues and 
interested in discussing and debating them.  All of these elements provide a 
favorable environment for the discourse of constitutionalism and rights in 
Hong Kong.  For what, after all, is the business of constitutional adjudication 
but “an ongoing discourse—a discourse with the other levels and branches 
of government, with the people at large, with courts that have gone before 
and courts yet to be appointed”?193  As this article has shown, this discourse 
is very much alive and well in Hong Kong.  The conversation and debate 
about the Hong Kong Basic Law will go on, for the Basic Law is—to 
borrow from what Professors Tribe and Dorf wrote of the American 
Constitution—“a text to be interpreted and reinterpreted in an unending 
search for understanding.”194 
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